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Paid Organ Donations and the
Constitutionality of the National Organ
Transplant Act
by JOHN A. ROBERTSON*
I. Introduction
Organ transplant is a well-established medical therapy that saves
thousands of lives. Yet many people who could survive with
transplants die on waiting lists. With ever expanding indications for
transplant, the supply of organs will never meet demand.' But many
more organ transplants could occur than do.
Efforts to increase organ supply have been constant since the
advent of allografting organs in the 1960s. Most of these efforts
focused on cadaveric sources and led to enactment of brain death
statutes, organ donor cards on driver's licenses, required request laws,
and the like. Still yielding only about 10,000 transplants a year, the
latest move to increase supply has been to retrieve donated organs
immediately after cardiac death. While the distribution of cadaveric
organs had initially been a problem, a satisfactory system for
distributing cadaveric organs is now in place.'
* Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin Law School. I
profited greatly from a presentation of this paper to the Drawing Board series at the
University of Texas Law School. I am particularly grateful for the helpful comments of
Mitchell Berman, Julia Markovits, and I. Glenn Cohen, and the library assistance of Casey
Duncan.
1. Developments in regenerative medicine using a person's own stem cells to
recreate needed organs or to populate bioartificial ones created with an artificial scaffold
may eventually meet some current needs for organs. Henry Fountain, A First: Tailor-
Made With Body's Own Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, at Al.
2. Robert Steinbrook, Donations after Cardiac Death, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 209
(2007).
3. The United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") allocates cadaveric
donations. Even former Vice-President Dick Cheney had to do his time on the waiting list
to receive a new heart. Living donors, however, ordinarily designate who the recipient is.
For information on UNOS, see UNOS, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
The authority for such a system originated in the provisions of the organ procurement and
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Living donors are also an important part of the supply picture.
Bone marrow donors and family kidney donors are usually still
living.' An important part of kidney donation is now the use of
unrelated live donors, some of whom have had no prior connection
with the recipient. Donation of part of a liver, which will then
regenerate, is also occurring from live donors, most notably to family
members.! However, the donation of other solid organs, such as
hearts and lungs, requires the death of the donor.'
A recurring issue in talk of ways to increase organ supply has
been the use of financial incentives. Since money works so well in
allocating goods and services in markets, why not allow a market
system for organ donations?'
The anti-money crowd decries payment, claiming that it will lead
to the coercion and exploitation of poorer persons, the drying up or
crowding out of altruism, less safe organ transplants, and that
transacting for donor organs is immoral because the body and its
transplantation network envisioned in the National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984.
42 U.S.C. § 274 (2006). Periodically issues about allocation do arise. Benjamin E. Hippen
et at., Risk, Prognosis, and Unintended Consequences in Kidney Allocation, 364 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1285 (2011).
4. Living donors have averaged about 6,500, and deceased donors about 7,500, for
the last decade. Deceased donors, however, yield more transplanted organs (22,158 in
2011) than the single kidney or occasionally partial liver transplant obtained from a living
donor (6,019 in 2011). See U.S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH ADMINISTRATION, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
latestData/step2.asp. (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
5. Partial liver donation has a higher morbidity rate than living kidney donation
because it is a more invasive procedure. The fourth death in 4,126 living liver donor
transplants since 1998 occurred in Denver on August 14, 2010, three months after a similar
death in Massachusetts. Kirk Mitchell, Rare Death of Liver Donor at CU Hospital
Prompting Concern, DENVER POST, Aug. 14, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci15775015 (last updated Aug. 14, 2010, 8:35 AM).
6. Under the dead donor rule, the donor of such vital organs must be deceased
before the organs can be removed because the law of homicide prohibits such sacrificial
deaths. John A. Robertson, The Dead Donor Rule, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 6
(Nov./Dec. 1999). Recall J.B.S. Haldane's quip that "I'd lay down my life for two brothers
or eight cousins." JOHN BURDEN SANDERSON HALDANE, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF SCIENTIFIC QUOTATIONS (W.F. Bynum & Roy Porter, eds., Oxford University Press
2006).
7. Buying organs for transplant also raises problems, e.g., the wealthy could outbid
the less wealthy, thus skewing the distribution of recipients. It could also expand the
possibilities for extortion where the matched donor keeps raising the price of the organ
since the recipient is so much in need. The UNOS system avoids those problems. See
UNOS, supra note 3.
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parts should not be sold.' The pro-payment lobby cites the
inadequacy of altruism to meet needs for transplant. They believe
that the safety and exploitative aspects of a paid system can be
managed with informed consent and screening laws, and price
controls on the amount paid. Also, social norms about reciprocity in
gift giving argue for something more tangible than a "thank-you,"
particularly when most other participants in the transplant system
(doctors, nurses, hospitals,) profit from organ transplants, and
research subjects, surrogate mothers, and blood, sperm, and egg
donors are paid for taking on risk.'
Public policy in the United States settled the issue in 1984 with
the enactment of the National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA").o A
proposed international kidney brokerage operation, which would
have matched willing buyers and sellers for a fee of $5,000, focused
Congress' attention on the problems with a market in organs." The
resulting legislation made it a federal felony to provide "valuable
consideration" for organs, but kept an exception for renewable or
plentiful tissue such as blood, sperm, and eggs.12 Bone marrow, which
is renewable, is not on that list of exceptions. As a result, no payment
can be offered for organ or marrow donations or even for joining a
registry of persons who are willing to donate for a fee. The federal
ban applies even if the reward is a scholarship, help with rent or a
home mortgage, or donation to a charity of one's choice.2
Despite literature more favorable toward paid donations than in
the past, there has hardly been a budge in this position.14 In 1996,
8. Drawing on work of Michael Sandel, Glenn Cohen calls these "corruption"
concerns. I. G. Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the
Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689,691 (2003-2004).
9. See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic Dimensions of Altruism:
The Case of Organ Transplantation, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2008).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
11. H. Barry Jacobs, a de-licensed doctor, had testified before Congress regarding his
plans to set up a brokerage system for profit that would obtain Third World donors for the
United States market. See I. G. Cohen, Can the Government Ban Organ Sale? Recent
Court Challenges and the Future of US Law on Selling Human Organs and Other Tissue,
12 AMER. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1983 (2012).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 247e(a). Note that NOTA bans payment both for donating and
receiving organs.
13. They would count as "valuable consideration."
14. Julia D. Mahoney notes the growing academic and professional literature that
finds that "financial incentives for organ sources offer a morally acceptable and potentially
effective means of augmenting the organ supply." Julia D. Mahoney, Altruism, Markets,
and Organ Procurement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 18, n.7 (2009). She also notes
that the mainstream media often has editorials in favor of payment and that the American
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Pennsylvania did create a fund to be used for the funeral expenses of
cadaveric donors, but the hovering presence of NOTA discouraged
state officials from implementing it." In 2008, NOTA was amended
to clarify that paired living donor chains were not covered by the
Act's ban on payment and consequently, some expansion of what
counts as a compensable expense has occurred." Despite the clamor
of more voices in favor of payment, no major change in NOTA may
occur for years to come, even for experimental programs. 7
Might a constitutional attack on NOTA advance the process?"
The idea is rooted in the notion of self-defense as a basic right. An
organ transplant is critically important to a person with end-stage
organ disease who is fighting for her life against the depredations of
trauma, illness, and disease. Some argue that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Second Amendment as protecting an individual
right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense should extend
to medical self-defense as well." Others rely more directly on
substantive due process for a negative right to safe and effective
medical care to protect life and liberty.20
Medical Association ("AMA"), once implacably against any use of payment, now favors
further study of financial rewards for deceased donors. Id. See also R.S. Gaston et al.,
Limiting Financial Disincentives in Live Organ Donation: A Rational Solution to the
Kidney Shortage, 6 AMER. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2548 (2006); but see M. D. Fox, The
Price Is Wrong: The Moral Cost of Living Donor Inducements, 6 AMER. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2529 (2006).
15. Up to $3,000 could be paid for "reasonable... funeral expenses... incurred by
the donor or the donor's family in connection with making a vital organ donation." 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8622. (West 2012).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). A living donor who is willing to donate to a family member,
A, but is not a good match promises to donate to a nonfamily member, B, in return for B's
family donor who is not a good match for B donating to A. They are defined as "human
organ paired donations" and not covered by the ban on paying valuable consideration for
organs. § 274e(a), (c)(4); see also Kevin Sack, 60 Lives, 30 Kidneys, All Linked, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19,2012, at Al.
17. Indeed, one legislative solution would be to exempt from NOTA's ban on
payment an organization certified by federal or state departments of health and human
services that meet high standards of review of consent, voluntariness, protect against
injury, and are limited in their payment scheme. See discussion infra Part VIII.
Modification of 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2006) may also be necessary (limiting the availability of
organs for transplant to qualified nonprofit organ procurement organizations).
18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590 (2008).
20. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007). Situations of self-defense draw on a
deeper sense of the importance of life to an individual when threatened by others or by
disease or illness. Both situations thus involve the right to life-the individual's right to
protect or preserve his life.
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Whatever the theory, it will be a hard slog-but not an
impossible one-to get courts to recognize such a right. On the
procedural side, it would require an as-applied challenge either by a
would-be recipient and paid donor that avoided the larger problems
that an unfettered market in organs would pose or an organization
that would broker or otherwise acquire and distribute paid organs in
a highly regulated way with health, safety, consent, and background
screens of donors and caps on payment.
On the substantive side, recognizing new rights is controversial
and difficult. Still, because organ transplantation is a well-accepted
treatment for many life-threatening conditions, the idea that the state
cannot prohibit a person from using an accepted therapy to save or
defend his life should have some appeal. Since bans on paid donation
make it difficult, if not impossible, for many persons to receive
transplants, NOTA's prohibitions substantially burden that right.
This means that some form of heightened scrutiny beyond rational
basis should apply to NOTA. NOTA supporters can satisfy a stricter
scrutiny if the alternative is a free, unregulated market in organs.
NOTA fares less well in other applications discussed below.
This article analyzes the constitutionality of NOTA when applied
to privately run regulated systems that strive to meet objections to
payment for organs. Part II discusses Flynn v. Holder's validation of
NOTA on rational basis review. Part III presents the case for strict
scrutiny when a safe and effective medical treatment is available.
Part IV meets objections to strict scrutiny based on Washington v.
Glucksberg's denial of a patient's right to physician-assisted suicide.
Part V shows that Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, a D.C. circuit case
denying a terminally ill patient access to an experimental drug, also is
no bar to a right to access medically accepted organ transplants. Part
VI addresses standing and burden issues in as-applied challenges to
NOTA. Part VII assesses how three payment programs (free market
libertarianism, paid kidney donations, and paid cadaveric donations)
would fare if the government had to meet a stricter scrutiny than
rational basis to apply NOTA to them. Part VIII argues that the
deference to legislative judgment should not continue when as-
applied challenges based on a right of medical self-defense require
government to meet strict scrutiny to limit that right.
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H. Flynn v. Holder Playing the Rational Basis Card to
Challenge NOTA
Shaka Mitchell and some colleagues had a clever idea. As a
lawyer in Nashville who had worked at the libertarian Institute for
Justice in Washington, he was familiar with the difficulties that
patients had in getting matched bone marrow donations. Mitchell
and a few others decided to challenge NOTA's exclusion of payment
for bone marrow tissue." Although it was a renewable tissue, NOTA
made paying money to bone marrow donors illegal, even though
payment for other renewable tissue like blood, sperm, and eggs was
permitted, and marrow donation was of low risk.
Together with Jeff Rowes at the Institute of Justice, Mike
Hamel, a bone marrow recipient in Colorado, and others, Mitchell
created MoreMarrowDonors.org ("MMD.org"), an organization that
would offer designated rewards of $3,000 for scholarship, charitable
contribution, or housing expenses if someone registered with the
organization and followed through with a bone marrow donation if
matched.2 Because NOTA would make paying such "valuable
consideration" a crime, that organization and others filed suit in
federal district court in California, seeking to have the ban on paying
for bone marrow donations found unconstitutional on equal
protection and substantive due process grounds.23
The suit was dismissed in the district court for failure to state a
claim,24 but was reversed in part by the Ninth Circuit, which held that
the ban on paying for "bone marrow" in NOTA applied only to
extraction by aspiration and not retrieval by peripheral blood
apheresis.' The court found that apheresis was essentially a blood
donation, and paying for blood was excluded from NOTA's ban.
21. LAW OFFICE OF SHAKA MITCHELL, http://www.mitchelllawpractice.com/
?pageid=8ot (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
22. Author's telephone conversation with plaintiff and cofounder Mike Hamel, Sept.
13, 2012.
23. They were represented by the Institute for Justice, which had been instrumental
in creating the organization and enlisting plaintiffs.
24. Flynn v. Holder, CV 09-7772-VBF(AJWx), document no. 33 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12,
2010) (http://www.pacer.gov/).
25. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs limited their appeal
to a lack of a rational basis, not pressing the substantive due process claim made and
rejected by the district court on the basis of Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
26. The significance of each method of obtaining hematopoietic stem cells had not
been briefed by the parties, suggesting that the circuit court came up with the importance
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The court, however, held that bone marrow donation by aspiration
fell within the act and satisfied rational basis review. As the first
attempt to mount a constitutional challenge to NOTA, the case bears
careful study.
The plaintiffs consisted of three groups: patients or parents of
children with Fanconi anemia or leukemia that was treatable with
bone marrow transplants, a noted hematologist-oncologist who
specialized in bone marrow transplant treatments, and a nonprofit
corporation that "intend[ed] to use financial incentives to combat the
shortage of bone-marrow donors."27 The diseases involved were all
successfully treatable by matched bone marrow transplants, but
persons of mixed race or African American ancestry face an acute
shortage of matching donors.2
The case rested on the special role of bone marrow. Blood and
the many other components of bone marrow are replenished from
hematopoietic stem cells. If cancer or other diseases interrupt the
production of a continuous supply of fresh blood cells, a transplant of
the hematopoietic cells in bone marrow can restore that system.
Marrow cells were traditionally removed by the insertion of a long
needle into the bones of the hip and aspirating the marrow.2 9 While
this is still performed in 25% of cases, it is now more common to
obtain hematopoietic stem cells by peripheral blood stem cell through
a process called PBSC apheresis. That process occurs after five days
of drug injections to stimulate a donor's stem cell production in the
marrow. The donor's blood is then removed as in a blood donation
and run through a separator to collect the blood stem cells. The
donor's blood is then reinjected into the donor and the separated
blood stem cells into the recipient. Over several hours, the donor's
own blood stem cells will self-renew from the reinjected components,
of this distinction on its own. Cohen, Can the Government Ban Organ Sale?, supra note
11. Unless Congress acts, valuable consideration may now be paid for hematopoietic stem
cells obtained by peripheral blood apheresis in the states covered by the Ninth Circuit.
27. Complaint at 13, Flynn v. Holder, No. 2:09-cv-07772 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009).
MoreMarrowDonors.org ("MMD.org") is the nonprofit. All of the named plaintiffs are
members of MoreMarrowDonors.org, and two of them are board members.
28. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff Mark Hachey is the father of a child who is Caucasian-
Filipino. Plaintiff Akim DeShay is African American. Shaka Mitchell, cofounder and
President of MMD.org is African American.
29. For a detailed description of what is involved in donation by apheresis and
donation by aspiration see Flynn, 684 F.3d at 861.
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while the infusion of the donor's blood stem cells will hopefully
reconstitute the recipient's immune system."'
The great success of bone marrow transplants for blood disorders
is due to the ability to match donors and recipients with sufficient
specificity to reduce the chance of rejection or "graft vs. host"
("GVH") disease, in which the newly transplanted blood and immune
system cells attack the host recipient's tissues. GVH can be fatal or
result in serious lifelong medical complications. It will occur to some
extent in all transplants except those from an identical twin, but its
intensity will depend on the closeness of the match. Finding a
nonsibling close match is extremely difficult for patients with a more
diverse genetic heritage, such as African Americans or those of mixed
race parents, because they have the most heterogeneous or rarest
marrow-cell types.
Other than having a well-matched donor within one's family, it is
all but impossible for a patient to find a compatible unrelated donor
on her own. The only practical way of matching donors and
recipients is to create an enormous database cataloguing the marrow-
cell types of people who have agreed to serve as donors if the need
ever arises for their specific marrow-cell type." Since 1986, the
federal government has funded a national registry of prospective
donors that now lists over seven million potential donors. However, a
sizeable fraction of donors cannot be located when they are matched
with a recipient, and some fraction of those who can be located are
not willing to donate. Caucasian patients can find an available and
willing matched donor about 75% of the time, Hispanic patients
about 45% of the time, Asian Americans, 40% of the time, and
African-American patients only 25% of the time."
MoreMarrowDonors.org thought that a pilot program offering
"strategic financial incentives to marrow-cell donors" would increase
the number of donors, especially for hard to find African-American
matches." It hoped that by providing compensation more individuals
30. About 25% of donations are now by aspiration, which provides a purer product
than the more recently developed PBSC apheresis. The statistics on risk do not
distinguish between the two methods. No deaths have been reported from 35,000 stranger
donations in the United States over the last twenty-five years and the number of adverse
events, most of which clear up in a few hours, is less than 1%.
31. Complaint at 25, Flynn v. Holder, No. 2:09-cv-07772.
32. Id. at 26-27.
33. Id. at 27. The patient, family, and physician plaintiffs are members of MMD.org,
are willing to use donors recruited in this way, and support creation of the program. Like
MMD.org, they are deterred by the threat of NOTA's criminal sanctions from doing so.
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with rare marrow-cell types would be encouraged to sign up for the
national registry, stay in touch, and then if matched, follow through
with the donation process. Third-party philanthropists would provide
the funds for the awards, which would be paid only to individuals who
signed up with MMD.org and its national registry, notified the
transplant doctor of their participation, and presented medical proof
that the donation occurred. In its initial phase, compensation would
be paid only to minorities and persons of mixed race since they were
the most likely to have the rarest marrow-cell types.
MMD.org's plan to offer strategic compensation to minority
marrow-cell donors is defined as organ-selling under NOTA, making
it a felony punishable by up to five years in prison.34 Section 274(e)
defines "human organ" as among other things, "any subpart" of
human "bone marrow," which necessarily includes loose marrow cells
and stem cells, which are the components actually removed from a
donor's bone marrow and transplanted into the patient." The specific
incentives of MMD.org's pilot program-the scholarship, housing
allowance, or charitable gift-do not fall under any of the statutory
exceptions for expenses and thus, are illegal under the act.'
The complaint asserted that Congress included bone marrow in
NOTA by "mistake." The bill sent to President Reagan in 1984 for
his signature stated that the "term 'human organ' is not intended to
include replenishable tissues such as blood or sperm."" The Act's
final language excluded blood, sperm, and eggs from its prohibitions,
but for no apparent reason left out an exception for paying marrow
donors. Yet bone marrow is replenishable and retrieving it whether
by aspiration or apheresis poses no risk beyond that found in blood or
egg donation." This made little sense since the main goal in enacting
the ban was to outlaw markets in solid organs such as kidneys to
prevent wealthy patients from exploiting poor donors and leaving
them with a permanent organ deficit after invasive surgery.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a)-(b) (2006).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c) (2006).
36. These exceptions are for processing, transportation, and other medical expenses
and for renewable or plentiful tissue such as blood, sperm, and eggs. 42 U.S.C. §
274e(c)(2).
37. Complaint at 34-35, Flynn v. Holder, No. 2:09-cv-07772.
38. Id. at 34. The complaint alleged that donation of marrow cells by needle
aspiration is "no more dangerous than getting one's wisdom teeth pulled," and has less
risk to the donor than the hyperstimulation of the ovaries and transvaginal aspiration of
oocyte follicles needed to obtain donor eggs.
39. Id. at 33.
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A. Apheresis Not Within Ban on Payment
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
dismissal of the complaint in Flynn for failure to state a claim.'" It
upheld on statutory grounds the complaint's argument that retrieving
hematopoietic stem cells by PBSC apheresis was not illegal under the
statute, but rejected its claim that the ban on paying for bone marrow
by aspiration was not covered by the law and was constitutional under
a rational basis standard.4 1
Because the apheresis method did not exist in 1984, the court had
to construe the words of the statute to see what they implied about
extraction of stem cells by apheresis. 42 Most significant here is that
NOTA omits "blood" from its list of "human organs" in the statute
and regulations. 43 The court rejected the government's argument that
the statute's inclusion of "bone marrow" in its ban on payment
included "any subpart thereof," which would include hematopoietic
stem cells formed in the bone marrow.4 The government argued that
since those stem cells mature into blood cells and platelet cells in the
marrow, they are "'subparts' of the bone marrow, even when those
stem cells are obtained through apheresis, which is to say, from blood
flowing through the veins."4 The court found that this proved too
much. If everything that came from the bone marrow is a "subpart
thereof," the statute would prohibit compensating blood donors since
the red and white blood cells that flow through the veins come from
the bone marrow, just like hematopoietic stem cells. Yet the
government conceded that the statute doesn't cover blood
donations.47
The court also found that such an interpretation conflicts with
ordinary usage.48 The bloodstream consists of plasma containing red
and white blood cells, stem cells that will mature into either cell type,
and other substances that come from elsewhere in the body, such as
vitamin B12, which is found in the blood after it binds with an
40. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 865 (9th Cir. 2011).
41. Id. at 862. The legal significance of this difference was not briefed by the parties.
See supra note 26.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2006).
44. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 861.
45. Id. at 863.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 864.
48. Id. at 863.
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intrinsic factor in the small intestine. The government's argument
would treat vitamin B12 as "a subpart" of the intestine, and ban it
under regulations that prohibit paying donors for their intestines "or
subparts thereof."49 As the court notes, "every blood draw contains
some vitamin B12, and we still call the red liquid 'blood,' not 'guts."'s
Likewise, every blood draw includes some hematopoietic stem cells.
All that differentiates the blood draw in PBSC apheresis from the
blood drawn from a compensated blood donor, other than the
filtration process, is the drug given before the draw to stimulate stem
cell production.
The court then concluded that the word "subpart" refers to the
organ from which the material was taken, not the organ in which it
was created." Thus, once the stem cells are in the bloodstream, they
are a "subpart" of the blood, not the bone marrow. By contrast,
paying for part of the liver for a liver donation would violate the
statute because of the "subpart thereof" language-a liver lobe is a
subpart of the liver. But taking something from the blood that was
created in the marrow takes only a subpart of the blood, and thus is
not part of the ban on paying money for "an organ .. . or any subpart
thereof.""
This statutory interpretation, narrow though it may be and
applicable only in the states covered by the Ninth Circuit, opens the
door to paying donors for extraction of hematopoietic stem cells from
the bloodstream through apheresis. It is not clear whether MMD.org
will go forward with their plan limited to donation by apheresis. In
any case, other bone marrow registries might use financial incentives
for their efforts within the states of the Ninth Circuit to recruit people




52. Id. The court also rejected the government's argument that Congress did intend
"bone marrow" to mean something different from ordinary usage because of the
enactment of the Stem Cells Therapeutic and Research Act of 2005 "to provide for the
collection and maintenance of human cord blood stem cells for the treatment of patients
and research." Id. at 864. The definition of bone marrow in that statute, however, was
contained in a different "part" of 42 U.S.C. § 274-1, and thus did not alter the meaning of
"bone marrow. .. and any subpart thereof" in the section of the statute at issue. Id.
53. Although the bone marrow registries have been united against payment, there is
competition among them, and some might decide to pay for donations by apheresis. For
the efforts of a large private registry to recruit donors, see Thomas Caywood, Officials Rip
Health Chain's Aggressive Bone-Marrow Campaign, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
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Because it is not within the statutory ban, there was no need for the
court to decide whether prohibiting compensation for PBSC
apheresis was constitutional. If Congress chooses to revise NOTA to
undo this interpretation, then constitutional issues of rational basis
and stricter scrutiny will arise.
B. Rationality of NOTA's Ban on Paid Marrow Donations by Aspiration
Although the plaintiffs directed most of their arguments to the
apheresis method, they also attacked the ban on payment for stem
cells obtained by the traditional method of aspiration. The court
found that NOTA banned payments for bone marrow aspiration
because it was the bone marrow itself that was recovered, not just
blood that had been derived from bone marrow as in the apheresis
method. Addressing the plaintiffs' claim that such coverage is a
violation of equal protection because the act exempted other forms of
renewable tissue, such as blood and sperm from the ban, and riskier
procedures such as egg donation, the court applied rational basis
review and upheld its application to aspirated bone marrow.
As noted above, the inclusion of bone marrow in NOTA's
prohibitions on payment may very well have been an oversight or
mistake. Bone marrow cells are renewable and inexhaustible, and
there is almost no risk in removing them either by apheresis or needle
aspiration, though the latter is more intrusive than donating blood or
sperm.54 Paid donation of eggs, which are plentiful but not renewable,
is also intrusive and more risky, and yet legal in all but one state."
articles/2010/12/17/officials rip-health chains-aggressive-bonemarrow-campaign.
(Describing a recruitment drive for Caitlin Raymond International Registry by a
Massachusetts hospital chain conducted in New Hampshire that used models in short
skirts and spike heels to entice people to sign up for its bone marrow registry while
allegedly misleading consumers about the costs of testing, which were then billed to their
insurance companies for as much as $4,300 per test).
54. One registry states that thirty to forty hours of time may be required for a
donation. Cell collection by apheresis will require daily injection of filgrastim for four
days before collection, which takes about four to six hours during one or two consecutive
days. Many donors experience flu-like symptoms, such as headaches, bone and muscle
achiness, and fatigue. Most side effects subside within 48 hours of donating. Donation by
aspiration is a half-hour procedure done under general anesthesia, and most donors are
discharged at the end of the day. Many donors experience some pain, bruising, and
stiffness for up to two weeks after their donation. Within a week of donating most donors
are able to return to work, school, and most regular activities. DKMS AMERICAS, Get
Educated, available at http://www.dkmsamericas.org/educate.
55. See IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-46-5-3 (West 2012). Several states, however, make it a
crime to pay for an egg donation for research, even as they allow payment of eggs for use
by infertile women.
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There are advantages to the aspiration method since a richer, more
concentrated sample of stem cells is obtained than would be in
peripheral blood, and donation by that method may be necessary for
younger recipients.
Nevertheless, it is a truism of both due process and equal
protection analysis that the state need not be perfect in drawing lines.
Regulatory legislation "is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in the light of facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators."" The standard drawn by Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. is
even more forgiving of roughly drawn measures. The Court will not
intervene even if a measure "exact[s] a needless, wasteful
requirement."' It is enough that the legislature "might have
concluded" that it served a useful purpose, even if the law is not "in
every respect logically consistent with its aims."" As the Court
famously stated, "[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might have been thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.""
Under the generous rational basis tests of Carolene Products and
Lee Optical, the Ninth Circuit had an easy time finding that the
exclusion of paid marrow-cell donations from NOTA's exceptions-
that is, that the act banned payment for them-was constitutional.
The court found that either policy or philosophical concerns about
paid donation satisfied rational basis review.
On the policy side, the court found it enough that Congress "may
have been concerned that exploitive market forces could be
triggered" if bone marrow or other organs could be bought or sold.'
Existing illegal markets in organs extracted by fraud or force by organ
thieves might be stimulated by paying for organ donation (including
bone marrow by aspiration). Compensation might also degrade the
quality of organ supply by inducing potential donors to lie about their
medical history in order to make their organs marketable. The $3,000
56. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). This begs the
question of what "an ordinary commercial transaction" is, but the category is broad and
capacious and would easily encompass payments for bone marrow donations.
57. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
58. Id. at 487.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
61. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011).
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housing subsidy, scholarship or charitable donation is not too small
for people of low income to have these effects. Or so Congress might
believe.2
Note that the court addressed the potential problems with paid
organ donations in a general manner and assumed that they would
also apply to paid marrow donation by aspiration, even though the
risk and harm profile is quite different than paid donation of solid
organs." For example, the risks of paid donation for a renewable
tissue like bone marrow are much less pronounced than the risks of
paid kidney donation, and depending on the amount of
compensation, the incentive to lie about medical history or the
potential for unfair exploitation may be much lower. Under Carolene
Products, the inclusion of a particular item or article would have to
meet the rational basis test, not just the overall statute. While it's
unclear whether the Flynn court is addressing the larger question of
solid organ donation or marrow donation by aspiration, presumably
its analysis would apply to both kinds of paid donation.
On the philosophical side, Congress might have been concerned
about the instinctive revulsion people feel at denial of bodily integrity
and removal of flesh from one human for use by another, especially
when "commodification" or money is involved. Hence our use of the
term "donor" rather than "vendor" or "seller," and the qualms that
one feels at someone selling their kidney to feed their family.6 It
doesn't matter that these philosophical reasons are "in some respects
vague, in some speculative, and in some arguably misplaced," and
that there are strong contrary views.' Congress need have only a
rational basis, not a perfect fit, for its categories, and may treat
62. Id. It did not mention additional grounds for the ban cited by leading transplant
and transfusion organizations, such as the effect of paid marrow donors replacing those
willing to donate for purely altruistic reasons or the ethical problem of putting a physician
in the morally dubious position of carrying out medical procedures solely or partially so
that sellers might profit. See Leading Transplant and Transfusion Organizations Join
Forces in Effort to Keep Bone Marrow Donation Voluntary, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 22,
2010, available at http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/permalink/?ndmView.
63. The same question would arise if Congress acted to bring paid apheresis within
the NOTA's prohibitions. See infra Part III.A.
64. The court here drew heavily on Leon Kass' reliance on taboos against
cannibalism, defilement of corpses, and necrophilia. Flynn, 864 F.3d at 861; LEON R.
KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS
183 (2002). Of course, the revulsion may stem less from analogies to cannibalism and
necrophilia than from a social system that leaves persons in a situation in which selling
their tissue or organs is a rational choice. Id. at 862.
65. Id. at 861.
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comparable or riskier cases, such as paid egg donation, differently.
The distinction that Congress drew between bodily material that is
and is not compensable has a rational basis, and that is all that is
needed to satisfy equal protection."
Again, the philosophical arguments seem more applicable to
paid donation of solid organs from live or cadaveric sources, rather
than aspiration of bone marrow, which is hardly cannibalistic and not
inconsistent with many other paid practices, such as payments to
research subjects, surrogate mothers, egg donors, and workers in risky
or arduous settings. A rational basis test, however, allows the state to
draw loose lines based on conjecture and speculation and that is what
Congress has done.
III. Strict Scrutiny for Bans on Paid Marrow Donations
The ease of satisfying rational basis review in Flynn v. Holder for
aspirated bone marrow, however, does not settle the matter of
constitutionality if heightened scrutiny under due process or equal
protection applied.6 ' Before turning to the argument in favor of
stricter scrutiny, I will address the effect of strict scrutiny if applied to
the ban on paid marrow donations.
Suppose that Congress after Flynn v. Holder amends NOTA to
cover bone marrow transplants by apheresis, which the Ninth Circuit
found to be outside of the statute. The plaintiffs in Flynn v. Holder
again file suit against NOTA, repeating their arguments about the
lack of rational basis and adding arguments about the need for
stricter scrutiny.
For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that there is full and
proper screening of the donor's health, that the donor understands
the risks and voluntarily chooses to undergo them, and that the
payments in this case are those originally proposed by MMD, and not
66. Moral revulsion directed at particular groups, such as homosexuals, may not even
fit rational basis. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
67. The standard account of strict scrutiny is compelling state interest and no less
restrictive alternatives, but the analysis need not be so rigid or doctrinaire. Sometimes the
stricter standard might be put in intermediate scrutiny terms as occurs with classifications
on the basis of sex: does the statute "serve important governmental objectives and is [the
classification] substantially related to achievement of those objectives." See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Ultimately, the question is whether the statute's harm to
the protected interest is out of proportion to its goals, with the burden on the government
to show that justification. See United States v. Alvarez, No. 11-210, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June
28, 2012) (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act
violates the First Amendment).
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direct cash payments. However, cash payments may make no
difference in the paid marrow donation context because the risks are
relatively slight, and NOTA bans both cash and noncash
consideration.
A. Ban on Paid Apheresis
Supporters of the ban of paid donation by apheresis would make
the same arguments they made in Flynn v. Holder, in which the court
found a rational basis for banning marrow donations by aspiration
though not by apheresis.8 Before turning to stricter scrutiny, the
court would have to address the rational basis argument in the
context of paid apheresis, which its previous statutory analysis had
avoided. The outcome would depend on whether the court would
apply rational basis with more muscle than is customarily done. A
court that is more demanding of rational basis might well find that the
ban on paid apheresis is invalid because it is so similar to paid blood
donations, but courts are generally reluctant to invalidate on that
basis.69
Assuming that the court found that rational basis was satisfied, it
would be difficult to find that it met stricter scrutiny.o For example,
the belief that a marrow donation that rests on a "purely altruistic
desire to help others is safer than one that relies on personal gain" is
certainly minimally rational in that it is more likely to ensure that
donors are truthful about their family and medical history and thus
more likely to be free of infectious diseases. But banning apheresis
donations may or may not add any significant protection to recipients.
The donors, like other blood donors, would be screened for HIV and
other infectious diseases. The slight possibility that they would lie or
hide something that would not be picked up by other tests seems too
speculative to justify banning the payments for apheresis donations
that may be necessary to save a patient's life.
Similarly, the idea that paid donors might be so influenced by
possible financial gain to ignore the health risks associated with
68. See supra note 40.
69. When the disparity between the state's purpose and the reasonableness of the
statutory classifications is great enough, courts occasionally find that even loose rational
basis is not satisfied. Compare Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002) (no
rational basis for requiring that sellers of caskets be licensed as funeral home operators),
with Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (rational basis satisfied in funeral
operator license requirements for casket sellers).
70. A court reluctant to invalidate here under rational basis may be even more
reluctant to find the need for strict scrutiny.
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donation is at best minimally rational if the risks are the same as
donating blood. While the possibility of financial gain may be a
factor in a decision to donate, this possibility is such a minimal risk
that undue inducement hardly seems to be the proper term.
Coercion or compulsion by third-parties who might profit in some
way from the designated compensation is also highly speculative."
None of these concerns should satisfy heightened scrutiny in the
plaintiffs' as-applied challenge to the amended statute.
Compensating donors might also deter those who are willing to
donate for purely altruistic reasons.7 ' For example, it might make the
National Bone Marrow Donor Program and its affiliates less effective
in signing potential donors up without payment, but that is one of the
advantages of paid donations-that it induces more donors to sign up,
even if fewer will volunteer without the incentives. But as seen with
blood, the existence of a paid system coexists quite nicely with a truly
voluntary system. Also, it is not clear why the threat to a purely
altruistic system is so important that it would justify denying needy
patients who would not otherwise receive a stem cell transplant unless
apheresis was paid.
Finally, there is the additional moral or philosophical concern
about transacting for body parts.74 But paid blood donations are
already allowed, and doctors and health care workers who administer
the treatments are paid, so it is difficult to see how the rewards
provided to apheresis donors pose a different threat here simply
because the donations are used for blood disorders and cancers. It
would stretch credulity to say that it does, and no one would pretend
that it satisfies a heightened scrutiny.
B. Ban on Paid Donation by Aspiration
A more likely scenario would be that Congress does not amend
NOTA to ban paid apheresis, which under Flynn would leave
NOTA's ban on paid donation by aspiration still applicable. Having
seen that ban would meet a minimal rational basis standard, the
71. See Ezekial Emanuel, Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts, 5 AMER. J.
BIOETHICS 9-13 (2005).
72. Since they would first have to register, and then go through with the donation
after a matched donor is found, coercion or compulsion by a third party would be more
focused on the latter stage.
73. For more on the "crowding out" issue, see Mahoney, supra note 14, at 25-26; see
infra notes 93 and 193.
74. These are the corruption issues discussed by Michael Sandel and Glenn Cohen.
See Cohen, supra note 8 at 691.
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question is whether banning paid donations by aspiration could meet
stricter scrutiny.
One problem for the plaintiffs would be showing that the ban on
paid aspiration would interfere or burden the right to receive a
hematopoietic stem cell transplant if paying for stem cells by
apheresis is legal. Would a patient gain anything by paid aspiration if
apheresis would do as well?75 In fact, 25% of marrow donations are
by aspiration. Doctors may prefer the richer supply of stem cells that
is obtained when retrieved directly from the bone marrow,
particularly for younger patients or when there are contraindications
for the drugs used to stimulate the cells collected by PBSC apheresis.76
Inserting a needle into the hip bone under general anesthesia to
retrieve marrow is minimally risky to the donor though it may be
more painful, leave soreness, and require time off from work, school,
or other activities." So the question is whether these inconveniences
and effects are so great that a financial incentive to compensate for
them would exploit a potential donor's financial need in such an
unacceptable way that justifies denying a lifesaving marrow donation.
This question must be asked of the other concerns: less safe marrow,
the riskiness of the donation, the threat of fraud, coercion, or
compulsion, the loss of a purely altruistic donation system, and the
like." None of those concerns appear to be so substantially advanced
by the ban on paid aspiration that they justify denying patients or
donors who would benefit from marrow collection that avenue.
There is also the problem that more risky and painful procedures
for money are permitted by NOTA, such as paid egg donation for
research or infertility treatment, which involves hormonal
stimulation, transvaginal retrieval, and the risk of ovarian
hyperstimulation syndrome, and surrogate motherhood, which
involves the risks of pregnancy and childbirth." Also, federal law
allows research subjects to be paid for painful and intrusive
75. In the abortion setting, the Court held that there may be no difference if the
outcome and the risk are the same. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162-67 (2007)
(slight preference for partial birth abortion as aiding a woman's health did not create an
undue burden on the right to abortion when a legislature finds no advantage).
76. Claudia Anasetti, Brent C. Logan, Stephanie J. Lee et al., Peripheral-Blood Stem
Cells versus Bone Marrow from Unrelated Donors, 367 NEJM 16 (2012) (bone marrow
may reduce the risk of chronic graft versus host disease).
77. See DKMS Americas, supra note 54.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
79. Institute of Medicine, Assessing the Medical Risks of Human Oocyte Donation
for Stem Cell Research: Workshop Report (7-12 Linda Giudice et al., eds., 2007).
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experimental procedures funded by the government.8o Arguably the
benefits are less direct for the infertile couple, who might have other
alternatives, such adoption or family donors, than is the continued life
for the marrow recipient. Also, the benefits of clinical research are
much less certain than the benefits of a necessary transplant and are
much less direct. At bottom, the different treatment seems to be
aimed at the moral objection to paying a person to undergo risk and
intrusion for money. Of course, moral sentiments alone do not satisfy
strict scrutiny."
IV. The Case for Strict Scrutiny
Having seen how heightened scrutiny would require the
government to show a much stronger justification to ban paid
apheresis or aspiration than it needs under rational basis review, I
now address the case for heightened scrutiny. That case rests on
whether there is a (negative) constitutional right to medical care from
a willing doctor to a willing patient of a safe and effective medical
treatment such as organ transplant.
The case for strict scrutiny hinges on the preservation and
importance of life and health and whether restrictions on pursuing
that interest, such as a ban on paid donations, are unconstitutional
without a strong showing of governmental need to limit them. I will
focus on the right to have an organ transplant, which would include
the right to pay a doctor and donor for the services needed to obtain
it, but this same issue would arise with access to cancer drugs, tissue
cloned from embryonic stem cells, and many other
situations.82 Access to these treatments are, of course, only a small
part of the health services that people need and pale beside the
challenges of providing affordable health care to everyone.' But they
are crucial for those in need of organ transplants or other medical
treatments for which they can pay but which the law denies them the
80. See Emanuel, supra note 71.
81. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (moral objection to birth control not a compelling interest); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 577 (moral objection to homosexual sodomy not a rational basis for legislation);
see infra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
82. Paying for infertility treatment requiring a gamete donor or gestational surrogate
mother is another example, but that right may be independently protected as part of
procreative liberty. See John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and
the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490-1513 (2008).
83. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (upheld in part in Nat' Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
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access to do so. Why should they not have a right to get them from a
willing donor or provider when these treatments are essential to
preserve their lives?
Eugene Volokh has elegantly presented this case, terming it a
right of medical self-defense.8 His article draws on the common law
tradition of lethal self-defense, which applies even if the attacker is
innocent or the defender mistaken that there is a viable threat.5 He
sees a constitutional basis for the standard case of self-defense and
would extend it to medical needs as well.' Indeed, the Supreme
Court, in holding that the Second Amendment protected the right to
have a handgun in the home drew upon the natural right of self-
preservation as the source of its reading of the Second Amendment."
Volokh also argues that the right to abort a viable fetus to protect a
woman's life or health is further recognition of such a right, as is the
right to have burdensome medical treatment withheld, even at the
cost of one's life.? He argues that this right includes the right to take
on risks, such as the use of experimental drugs under Phase II FDA
approval for clinical research."
Medical self-defense, in one sense, is an apt and resonant term
for the right to safe and effective medical care.' To protect one's
body from the effects of trauma, virus, cancer, infection, etc., is to
defend one's self in that sense. Yet trauma, illness, and disease are
not agents or individuals directly attacking one, the usual terrain of
self-defense. As Volokh points out, however, self-defense applies
against animals and persons who due to infancy or mental illness are
not responsible agents." A virus, bacteria, or a cancer cell gone awry
is also an intruder or occupant of sorts who is acting outside of
84. Volokh, supra note 20. Professor Volokh's article was published before the en
banc decision in Abigail Alliance rejecting a right to use an unapproved experimental
drug, and before the litigation in Flynn.
85. Id. at 1831.
86. Id. at 1819-20.
87. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008).
88. Volokh, supra note 20, at 1825-26.
89. Id. at 1814-15 (referring to Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (en banc), discussed infra Part VI.
90. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996); see infra Part V (discussing
the need for narrow specification of a new due process right).
91. Volokh, supra note 20, at 1817 (discussing the right to kill threatening bears or
rattlesnakes protected by federal law).
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ordinary bounds, though strictly speaking, not outside the law.9 The
concept of self-defense should thus apply to the situation caused by a
smaller, biologic attacker, especially when it masses in such
multitudes as to overwhelm the body. Self-defense in this instance
would be understood as a right to use safe and effective medical
treatments to ward off those attacks.
In another way, however, pushing the right of access to safe and
effective medical treatment into the category of self-defense is not
apt. The cost of self-defense is the life of an innocent attacker (not
relevant to disease) or an innocent bystander due to the defensive
actions of the person who reasonably thinks she is being attacked.
Invalidating a ban on a safe and effective medical procedure that is
independent of other persons would not have those costs. However,
invalidating a ban on paid organ donations would mean that paid
donors would bear the cost of the loss of the organ sold or the
morbidity that occurs in the process of obtaining it.93 If the donor is
fully informed and makes an intelligent and knowing choice to donate
for money, these costs are lessened though they still exist. Such costs
may be worth the preservation of the life of the recipient, just as a
paid bodyguard knowingly takes on the risk of death or injury as an
aspect of the right to self-defense. To be acceptable, however, there
must be a further balancing of the donor's interests versus the
recipient's interests. The question under strict scrutiny would be
whether the interests at stake in barring a system of paid donation are
sufficiently greater than allowing the current system of unpaid
donation, which denies needy recipients the opportunity to extend
their lives through a system that increases organ supply through
financial rewards.
With this qualification in mind, medical self-defense thus may be
articulated as a right against unjustified governmental interference
with access to safe and effective medical treatment. By prohibiting
payment for the life-saving medical means to attack disease or organ
failure, the Legislature denies patients, and the doctors supporting
92. The innocent attacker's actions are illegal although excusable. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (West 2011) (providing insanity as an affirmative defense to
prosecution). Nonhuman animals are outside of the law in that they are not persons and
cannot be held accountable, though they can be killed or confined. The idea of
"punishing" a virus, cancer cell, or bacteria is obviously metaphoric.
93. There may also be costs to those who object generally to paid donations or those
who, due to such a system, might not receive future transplants from altruistic donors. For
further discussion of the crowding out argument against paid donation, see Mahoney,
supra note 14, at 25-26.
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them, the right to self-preservation, a right so basic it should be
treated by the Court as fundamental-or at least subject to a greater
scrutiny than the standard rational basis analysis of Carolene Products
and Lee Optical.
In short, the ban on paid organ donation deprives patients in
need of such transplants the "life" and "liberty" specified in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments' clauses.94 Being alive is a necessary
precondition to the exercise of other rights. Rights to free exercise of
religion, to free speech, to assembly, to association, to vote, to raise
children, to sexual and reproductive autonomy, or to pursue any right
or interest depends on possessing life itself. Because life is a primary
good on which realizing all other goods depends, it should have at
least the same protection when "life" and "liberty" are specified in
the constitutional text.95 State deprivation or interference with life,
therefore, should require at least as strong a justification as is needed
for depriving a person of other fundamental liberties, or at least a
scrutiny stricter than rational basis.96
A full exposition of the right to use safe and effective medical
treatments would extend beyond lifesaving treatments such as organ
transplants. One cannot pursue liberty interests if one is unable to
participate in ordinary life activities due to severe disability or pain.
Thus, the right to use safe and effective medical treatments could also
be grounded in liberty rights to be free of pain or disability.7 I leave
the scope of that right to future analysis.
The Second Amendment cases give support here, but they are
distinguishable by the Second Amendment's more explicit language.
94. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (discussing the right to
life of born persons, not whether unborn persons have a right to be born).
95. John Rawls' term "natural primary good" would include life and health because
they are necessary preconditions to realizing all other goods. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 62 (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1971) ("Other primary goods,
such as health and vigor, intelligence and imagination, are natural goods; although their
possession is influenced by the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control.").
One might think of free speech rights as a constitutional "primary good," since freedom of
thought and speech has been described as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27. Yet it
too cannot exist unless a person is alive and in sufficient health to exercise that freedom-
an even more primary good.
96. Indeed, a higher level of procedural correctness is required in capital
punishments cases precisely because life is at stake. Although these issues are usually
framed in Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" terms, they share
normative roots with the "right to life" component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
97. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996).
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Yes, District of Columbia v. Heller' and McDonald v. City of
Chicago" draw on a natural right to life, which includes repelling
one's attacker and having the means to do so. But because of the
Second Amendment text and the presence of a physical assailant, the
cases are not directly apposite. Still, the notion of self-defense does
lend support to the notion of a (negative) right to established health
care from a willing doctor to ward off viral, bacterial, or cellular
attacks." An organ transplant occurs at the point of attack when-by
analogy-there is a need to wield the gun. Banning payment for
organ donations is the equivalent of banning payment to buy a
handgun or the ammunition necessary to repel an expected invader.
However, buying the handgun per se does not threaten the life or
health of third-party individuals in the same way that paying for
removal of an organ does."o'
Adding rights via substantive due process, even one as narrowly
specified as a negative right to safe and effective medical treatment to
protect life, is always problematic for the Supreme Court. It is poor
consolation that the Court has previously done so with rights of
family, marriage, child rearing, sexuality, reproduction, and the like,
because each step forward is controversial and bitterly fought
over. Indeed, the Second Amendment cases, Heller and McDonald,
take an originalist approach but rest on a traditional acceptance of a
deeper right of self-preservation or self-defense against
attackers. But why should that deeper right of self-preservation or
defense be predicated upon a human or mammal attacker, rather
than a virus, bacteria, or an immune system gone awry? If people
may buy and use handguns to protect themselves from human
attackers, even if innocent lives are lost in taking reasonable
defensive action, why shouldn't individuals be able to buy organs for
transplant or some other medical service when necessary to defeat an
even more imminent viral or bacterial attack, and when the donor,
98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590 (2008).
99. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
100. A more precise medical analogy to acquiring a handgun for the home before an
attack is imminent, would be the right to have an immunization to prevent infectious
disease.
101. It might increase the chance that the purchased gun through accident, negligence,
or intentional action would be used to kill or injure another person. Consider also the
ironies that would exist if the need for the transplant arose from an encounter with an
assailant that was not stopped with the patient's use of a handgun. A handgun could also
be used to prevent robbery of a health care worker carrying a donated organ into the
operating room for the transplant. A gun shop could advertise special programs and
weapons for those who are disabled and awaiting an organ donation.
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whether paid or unpaid, has intelligently, competently, and knowingly
assumed the risks involved?
In principle, that right should also apply, and if burdened by anti-
payment legislation, should be recognized by the courts." To make
that leap requires an even greater jump across a gap that the Court is
now extremely cautious about taking and appeared to reject in
Washington v. Glucksberg with regard to physician-assisted suicide.o3
While the Supreme Court is far from admitting the right to safe and
effective medical treatment into the due process pantheon, lower
courts might occasionally do so.tl At the very least, such action might
prod Congress and state legislatures to look more kindly on
legislative proposals to use financial incentives to spur more organ
donation.
Before turning to medical self-defense challenges to NOTA's
ban on paying bone marrow and organ donors, I examine the barriers
to recognition of a substantive due process right to medical care
presented by Washington v. Glucksberg and Abigail Alliance v.
Eschenbach. A different outcome in Glucksberg or Abigail Alliance
would not necessarily give a person the right to pay donors for organ
or tissue donations, but it would shift the burden on government to
show there is a more compelling need to justify NOTA's near total
ban on paying donors.
V. Getting Around Washington v. Glucksberg
A main hurdle to recognition of the right to pay organ donors is
the test elucidated in Washington v. Glucksberg for the recognition of
new substantive due process rights.'O In rejecting a due process right
of dying patients to have physicians assist them in committing suicide,
the Court upheld a state ban on physician-assisted suicide on the basis
102. Conservative judges Richard Posner and J. Harvie Wilkinson have criticized the
handgun cases as judicial interference with a workable legislative process that had little
textual support, which is the frequent criticism of why Roe v. Wade was not a
constitutionally sound decision. J. Harvie Wilkinson 1II, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
Unraveling of the Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REv. 254 (2009).
103. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996).
104. See id. The right in question is a negative right against government interference
with services or procedures for which the patient will pay. It is not a positive right to have
those services provided regardless of ability to pay.
105. NOTA would preempt state experimentation with payments and rewards to
organ and tissue donors.
106. See also Quill v. Vacco, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (the Court dealt with equal
protection aspects of the same issue).
[Vol. 40:2244 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
of a long history and tradition of preserving life. In doing so, it
enunciated a methodology for identifying due process rights that
could block courts from recognizing new rights. Neither of these
grounds, however, should bar a court from recognizing a fundamental
right to have safe and effective medical care essential to save one's
life, such as an organ transplant.
The terminally ill plaintiffs in Glucksberg wanted prescriptions
for drugs from their physicians that they could use if they chose to
end their suffering. Doctors willing to treat them and an organization
devoted to end-of-life care joined the suit. They were successful in
the district court, which found that a fundamental right was involved.
A Ninth Circuit panel rejected that conclusion and applied rational
basis scrutiny to uphold the law. 07 The en banc panel reversed,
finding a "due process liberty interest in controlling the time and
manner of one's death" that made the law unconstitutional as applied
to "terminally ill competent adults who wished to hasten their deaths
with medicine prescribed by their physician. "'o
The Supreme Court reversed the en banc court. It began "by
examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" and
found in almost every state, and indeed throughout the world, that
bans on assisted suicide were based on "longstanding expressions of
the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all
human life."" Even as states moved away from criminalizing suicide,
they retained bans on assisting suicide without exceptions for those
who were near death. That bar remained even when such individuals
authorized living wills, surrogate decision-makers, and withdrawal or
refusal of life sustaining medical treatment for at the end of life."o
The Court recognized the Due Process clause guarantees more
than fair process and that liberty protects more than the absence of
physical restraint. But the Court has been "reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decision-making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.""'
Finding such rights would remove the matter from the arena of public
debate and legislative action and risk subtly transforming the Due
107. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (1995).
108. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (1996) (en banc).
109. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1996).
110. The one exception was Oregon, which enacted an assisted suicide law in 1997.
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.865 (West 2012). Washington has since done so as well.
Massachusetts voters will decide in November 2012 whether to adopt a similar law.
111. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
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Process Clause into the policy preferences of members of this
Court."2 Chief Justice Rehnquist then articulated a much-cited view
about due process methodology:
The Due Process Clause specifically protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are objectively,
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," . . . and [are] "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed." Second, we have
required a "careful description" of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history,
legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial
"guideposts for responsible decision making" that
direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause ... [This] approach tends to rein in the
subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-
process judicial review."'
Applying that standard to physician-assisted suicide, the Court
found an "almost universal tradition... [against] ... the asserted
right to commit suicide with assistance, even for terminally ill,
mentally competent adults.", 4 To hold otherwise, the Court would
have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice to strike down
the considered policy choice of almost every state. It distinguished
the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment,
and thus hasten death, assumed in Cruzan as rooted to the common-
law rule that forced medication was a battery and a long tradition of
protecting the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. That
assumption was not "deduced from abstracts concepts of personal
autonomy," as the Glucksberg plaintiffs argued, but was entirely
consistent with "this Nation's history and constitutional traditions."
Language in Planned Parenthood v. Casey suggesting that many of
the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process clause grounded
in personal autonomy did not warrant the conclusion that "any and
all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.""
112. Id.
113. Id. at 720-722 (internal citations omitted).
114. Id. at 723.
115. Id. at 727.
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With the history of the law rejecting nearly all efforts to permit
assisted suicide, the Court found that the asserted right is not a
fundamental liberty interest, and therefore that Washington's ban
need only be rationally related to legitimate state interests. It found
that rational basis in several state interests: the preservation of human
life, preventing suicide, protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups from abuse and
neglect, and avoiding a slippery slope slide to voluntary and perhaps
*116even involuntary euthanasia.
A. Organ Transplant as the Reverse of the Right to Die
Glucksberg, however, should not bar recognition of heightened
protection for medical care that preserves life. The plaintiffs in
Glucksberg were seeking a "treatment" that would enable them to
die; organ transplant patients are seeking one that will enable them to
live. In that case, there was medical disagreement over whether
assisted suicide was an appropriate medical treatment."' There is no
medical disagreement about the appropriateness of organ transplant
for end-stage organ disease."' Of crucial importance to the
Glucksberg Court was the state's long-standing interest in preserving
life and preventing suicide, including protecting the lives of poor,
elderly, and disabled persons and avoiding both voluntary and
involuntary euthanasia."' Rather than harm those interests, safe and
effective organ transplantation advances them.20
116. Id. at 732. (At least five justices who voted in Washington v Glucksberg to uphold
a state ban on physician-assisted suicide noted that their vote in that case assumed that
terminal sedation and analgesics to control pain that might themselves hasten death were
available to dying patients. If the ban on assisted suicide did prevent effective pain relief,
there might have been more acceptance of an as-applied attack on it.).
117. The AMA and other physician groups rejected physician-assisted suicide
("PAS") as inconsistent with the doctor's duty to do no harm and blurring the line
between harm and treatment. Other doctors thought that PAS was consistent with a
doctor's duty to best meet her patient's needs.
118. Nor is there disagreement about whether doctors should be paid for doing organ
transplants, though some physician groups may object to paying donors.
119. The Court spoke of the "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life,"
which existed even though it was "symbolic and aspirational as well as practical." Id. at
729. While the reasons cited provide a rational basis for laws against physician-assisted
suicide, they would not in all cases provide a compelling justification for such laws. Nor
would they prevent reasonable regulation akin to that contained in Oregon's statute
authorizing assisted suicide when there has been a two-week delay, a further request, two
physician certification of terminal illness, lack of mental impairment or depression, record-
keeping and the like. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.865 (1997). Since the law was passed in 1997,
935 people have had prescriptions written and 596 (71 in 2011) have died from ingesting
prescribed medications, OR. DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT ANNUAL REPORT (2011),
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A right to use safe, effective, and established medical treatment
to save life, such as by organ transplantation, is thus the reverse of the
right claimed in Glucksberg to end life by assisted suicide. While end-
of-life cases involve rights to bring about death, a right to use safe,
effective, and accepted medical treatments involve the right to avoid
death. Given the long tradition of protecting life, it would be odd if
the state were free to adopt laws that threatened life, such as bans on
or interference with safe and effective organ transplantation, without
a showing of a compelling need for such laws. Unless it showed that
need, those laws should be unconstitutional.
In short, the state's commitment to preservation of life should
support rather than prevent courts from recognizing a due process
right to safe and established medical treatments necessary to protect
life. If there is such a right, the state would have the burden of
showing sufficiently strong grounds to justify laws that interfere with
its exercise beyond conjecture and speculation about harmful effects,
as it might do where no fundamental right is involved."'
B. Glucksberg's Due Process Methodology: Ordered Liberty and
Narrow Specification
Glucksberg rested heavily on the need to find a right in "our
Nation's history and traditions" or what is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if
available at http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/Evaluation
Research/DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/index.aspx.
120. Indeed, the availability of transplants will deter people with end-stage organ
disease from taking their own life. The state may have reasons related to the interests
specified in Glucksberg to limit means of organ retrieval for transplant, but not to ban or
limit transplants themselves. Once use of transplants is recognized as a protected liberty
interest or fundamental right, then the state must show a compelling justification and no
less restrictive way for limiting access to them.
121. Nothing in a right to established medical care prevents the state from enacting
regulations that are reasonably related to protecting the health and safety of patients
through drug approval, medical licensure, and other regulatory efforts. As noted in
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163-64 (2007), "state and federal legislatures [have]
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty" and "[m]edical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative
power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts." Id.
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they were sacrificed."12  And it required "a careful description of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest."
This part of Glucksberg brings us directly into the debate over
the level of generality in a tradition or historical practice to find that
history or tradition supports a claimed new right. One problem is
that history and tradition is partially mute and never univocal. One
can point to specific past practices that appear to support one's claim
or distinguish them as not fully applicable.
Supporters of a right to medical treatment will argue that a right
to use safe and effective medical treatments to extend life or reduce
pain and disability is also "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'2 4 Medical practice was not regulated by the states in 1789.
Medical licensure began in the 1830s, spurred by the drive to oust
itinerant and irregular healers.'" The right of licensed doctors to use
their clinical judgment in treating the ills of patients has long been
recognized as part of their professional domain, even if their
professional judgment could not help patients until the development
of sulfa drugs and antibiotics in the 1930s.126 Unlike claims of rights to
abortion and assisted suicide, which had to confront extensive state
restriction of those practices at the time of the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there is no comparable tradition of
legislative restriction on medical practice other than licensure until
well into the twentieth century.12 The Food and Drug
122. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. Other courts might approach the matter in a less
historicist way, e.g., the more expansive view contained in the plurality opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which Glucksberg
specifically rejected.
123. Id. Recall that the votes for this statement depended on there being adequate
alternatives to control pain.
124. Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
125. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 3--60 (Basic Books,
1982).
126. Relying heavily on empirics, medicine in 1868 was still ignorant of Koch's germ-
theory, and had minimally effective anesthesia and antisepsis for surgery. Indeed, doctors
relied on leeches, blistering, and bleeding well into the late 1800s. See id.; MICHAEL
BLISS, HARVEY CUSHING: A LIFE IN SURGERY 17-18 (Oxford, 2005). Tort law has
generally granted physicians the right to determine what was acceptable practice. See W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
127. The first federal drug law passed in 1914 to control nonmedical drug abuse left
physicians free to prescribe cocaine and opiates for legitimate medical purposes. Harrison
Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785; WILLIAM BUTLER ELDRIDGE,
NARCOTICS AND THE LAW; A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN NARCOTIC
DRUG CONTROL 9 (Chicago 1967); ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE
LAW 5 (Indiana 1965).
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Administration, created in 1906, did not begin to exercise premarket
approval of the safety and efficacy of drugs and biologics until the
thalidomide scandal in 1962."' Those changes did not prevent a
doctor from using any approved drug "off-label" for other medical
purposes.
The first organ transplant occurred between identical twins in
1954.129 Allografting-the use of a non-twin organ usually after
death-began soon after and took off in the 1960s with improved
tissue matching and immunosuppression."' Laws to enable cadaveric
donations and anatomical gifts were passed, making consent and
brain death the main focus of legal constraints on organ donation. It
was not until 1984 that the first law against paid donations was
enacted. While most states have now passed such laws, it is a
relatively new tradition, and must be weighed against a deeper and
longer tradition of recognizing the right of persons to protect
themselves against aggression from human or other sources, and
using otherwise legal medical assistance when available."' With bone
marrow and organ transplants not part of medicine until relatively
recently, a judge is perforce constrained to consider the larger
principle at stake and how it would apply to laws against paid marrow
and organ donations, when they would interfere with access to safe
and established lifesaving treatments.
One can read "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" in a
restricted way, but it is equally plausible and reasonable to think of
any governmental system of regulating liberty-giving order to the
exercise of liberty-as requiring that there be live persons for whom
that liberty matters and needs to be "ordered." If so, a right to use
widely accepted safe and effective medical treatments, such as
128. PHILIP HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 158-65 (Knopf 2002). After the scandal in 1937
of more than 100 deaths of children given an antimicrobial sulfanilamide preparation
dissolved in diethylene glycol, a lethal solvent, the 1938 amendments to the act did require
that manufacturers provide drugs that are safe. Id.; see Jerry Avorn, Two Centuries of
Assessing Drug Risks, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 193 (2012).
129. Joseph E. Murray and J.H. Harrison, Surgical Management of Fifty Patients with
Kidney Transplants Including Eighteen Pairs of Twins, 105 AMER. J. SURG. 205-18 (1963).
Dr. Joseph Murray received the Nobel Prize in Medicine for this work. See also Stefan G.
Tullius et al., Moving Boundaries-The Nightingale Twins and Transplantation Science,
366 N. ENG. J. MED. 1564 (2012).
130. Murray and Harrison, supra note 129.
131. It was a tradition of self-preservation and self-defense that led to the individual
Second Amendment right found in Heller and then incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment in McDonald.
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marrow-cell transplants for blood and immune system disorders and
live or cadaveric organ transplants for end-stage organ failure should
follow. In that case, the justification for laws that burden access to
such treatments, such as bans on paid donation, should be stronger
than if the right to defend and prolong one's life were not involved.
Limiting the right to safe and effective and widely recognized medical
treatments would also satisfy the "narrow specification" prong of
Glucksberg. In this case it is the right to use safe and effective
medical treatments, such as organ transplantation, unless there is a
compelling justification for laws that burden access to that treatment.
As a general proposition, courts should defer to legislative
choice. There is a wide realm of legislative discretion over the
practice of medicine in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty, but judicial deference need not mean judicial withdrawal
from the field."' Courts do have a role in policing the boundary
between an individual's life or liberty and legislative authority."'
Judges, however, will differ on how they read Glucksberg and how
welcoming they are to new unenumerated rights.
Consider Justice Scalia, a skeptic about most substantive due
process rights. In a noteworthy foray into the level of generality
debate in Michael H. v. Gerald D., a case involving the childrearing
rights of an adulterous father, he argued that one must look to the
"most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." 134 He
went on to note that if "there were no societal tradition either way. . .
we would have to consult and [if possible] reason from, the traditions
regarding natural fathers in general."'35 Given the absence of a
tradition of state restriction of licensed doctors determining whether
to use safe and effective medical treatment, might even Justice Scalia
recognize the larger principle of self-preservation and defense against
threats to life from illness and disease when there are safe and
established medical treatments to counter them?
Most likely not. Judges inclined to a large measure of deference
to legislatures will often find originalist or textual reasons for refusing
recognition of a "right to receive medical care." Traditions rarely
132. See case cited supra note 121 and accompanying text.
133. Laurence C. Tribe, Forward: Toward A Model of Rules in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1973).
134. See 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (state law presuming husband the father of child
conceived in adulterous relationship is valid).
135. Id.
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speak with a single voice. Such a move toward rights status could call
into question many aspects of federal or state regulation of drugs,
medical and surgical procedures, organ transplantation, and medical
licensure. A Supreme Court leery of substantive due process
lawmaking might be reluctant to interfere in legislative judgments
about tradeoffs between health, safety, and patient needs for therapy,
even as they apply heightened scrutiny.
Even if heightened scrutiny is required, the Court might find that
government has adequate justification for enforcing such limits on
organ donation. Although it is clear that a system of paid organ
donations without any regulation would not be viable, a more
carefully constructed program to avoid those excesses is a different
matter. The paid organ donation proposals discussed below come
with protective regulations in place."6 Because they could induce
donation of more organs and thus save lives, they deserve a closer
scrutiny from courts than mere rational basis and conjecture about
symbolic and aspirational harms.
VI. Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach and Access to
Experimental Drugs
Another barrier to recognition of the right of access to medical
treatment is Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, a case in which a circuit
court panel with a conservative justice found such a right but then was
reversed by the en banc court."' While Abigail Alliance is only one
court and other circuits might decide the matter differently, that
circuit is particularly influential. That court's reasoning, however,
would not bar recognition of such a right when the medical treatment
at issue was an established safe and effective treatment, as is organ
transplant for end-stage disease.
Abigail Alliance grew out of a young woman's losing battle with
late-stage esophageal cancer. She had failed several chemotherapy
regimens and wanted to receive a new drug called Iressa, which the
FDA had approved only for a Phase II study of efficacy. She was
denied access to that drug, and died a few months later. Iressa was
eventually approved for lung and colon cancers. Oncologists now use
it off-label for other cancers. Iressa, of course, is not a magic bullet.
136. These programs include health and safety screening, robust informed consent,
insurance policies and protection for paid donors, and price caps or designated noncash
rewards to reduce the chance of coercion, undue inducement, or overly optimistic
decisions by people in need of money.
137. 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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It was approved based on evidence that it delayed tumor growth for
esophageal cancer, not that it extended life significantly. It may or
may not even have had that effect for the young woman that sought
it.
As a result of this experience the patient's father, the families of
cancer patients, and others who thought that the FDA had been too
restrictive about approving new cancer drugs formed an organization
that sought expanded access to experimental drugs for the terminally
ill." Finding that that access was often barred by the investigational
new drug and clinical testing program required by the FDA, the
Alliance submitted its own proposals and then a "citizen petition" to
the FDA, arguing that there is a "different risk-benefit tradeoff facing
patients who are terminally ill and who have no other treatment
options," and that a lower evidentiary standard for safety and efficacy
should be applied in those cases.'39 The FDA never responded to the
Alliance's citizen petition. The Alliance then sued, arguing that the
United States Constitution provided terminally ill patients without
other treatment options a right of access to experimental drugs that
had passed Phase I clinical testing unless strict scrutiny of the need to
deny that access could be shown. The district court rejected its claim,
but the circuit court upheld it in a 2-1 decision." The circuit court en
banc then reversed the panel decision.
A. The Court's Reasoning
The en banc court began its analysis by citing the current go-to
precedent on the reach of substantive due process, Washington v.
Glucksberg, and the Court's observation that "The Due Process
clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."14 1
The Alliance argued that the right it claimed could be found in
that history and tradition because the government never interfered
with the judgment of individual doctors about the medical efficacy of
138. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.
139. Id. at 699.
140. One of the two votes in favor was from Judge Douglas Ginsburg, generally
known as a judicial conservative.
141. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1996). It also required a
"careful description of the asserted fundamental right interest." Id. But that requirement
played no further role in Abigail, nor does it in most other cases.
253Winter 2013] PAID ORGAN DONATIONS AND NOTA
254 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
particular drugs until amendments to the FDCA in 1962. The court,
however, found that "it must show not only a tradition of access to
drugs that have not yet been proven effective, but also a tradition of
access to drugs that have not yet been proven safe."14 2 Examining that
history, legal tradition, and practice on both safety and efficacy
grounds, the court found that "our Nation has long expressed interest
in drug regulation, calibrating its response in terms of the capabilities
to determine the risks associated with both safety and efficacy."
The court also rejected the Alliance's claim that completion of
Phase I testing shows that drugs are safe enough for terminally ill
patients. The fact that a drug is then safe "for limited clinical trial
testing in a controlled and closely-monitored environment after
detailed scrutiny of each trial participant does not mean that a drug is
safe for use beyond supervised trials."'44 It found that FDA
regulation of post-Phase I drugs is entirely consistent with an
historical tradition of prohibiting the sale of unsafe drugs. It also
found concerns with efficacy addressed before the 1962 amendments,
with concern increasing as technology evolved and new risks were
seen.
The court did note, however, that lack of government
interference "might be some evidence that a right is deeply rooted.
But standing alone, it cannot be enough."145 Otherwise one could use
such a premise "to support sweeping claims of fundamental rights."'46
The relatively recent regulation, for example, of marijuana and opium
did not alone support a fundamental right to use them. Nor does it
follow that we have a fundamental right to drive at any speed because
speed limits are a recent innovation. Otherwise, the prior lack of
regulation would "undermine much of the modern administrative
142. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703.
143. Id. at 703-05. The court found evidence of safety concerns as far back as 1736 in
Virginia, Louisiana (1803), South Carolina (1817), Georgia (1825), and Alabama (1852),
with 25 states or territories by 1870 having some form of regulation about safety, usually
about adulteration. Federal legislation on issues related to safety was passed in 1848 and
1902, and most significantly with the landmark Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906. The
current regime of federal drug regulation began to take shape with the 1938 FDACA,
requiring that drug manufacturers provide proof that their products were safe before they
could be marketed. In 1962 the efficacy requirement was added. Id.
144. Id. at 706.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 706-07.
[Vol. 40:2
PAID ORGAN DONATIONS AND NOTA
state, which like drug regulation, has increased in scope as changing
conditions have warranted."147
The court then addressed the common law doctrines of necessity,
tortuous interference with rescue, and the right of self-defense. The
Alliance had claimed that those doctrines supported "recognition of a
right of self-preservation [that] would give the terminally ill a
constitutionally protected right of access to experimental drugs.""
Among the problems with the Alliance's necessity argument is the
legislature's power to eliminate a necessity defense that might
otherwise be available when it so chooses-a choice that the court
found Congress had done with its detailed requirements for approval
of new drugs. It also found that the tort of noninterference with
rescue was not applicable because the experimental drugs had not
been shown to be safe, let alone effective, for prolonging the life of
terminally ill patients."'
Nor did the common law right of self-defense that allows one to
use "a reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he
reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful
bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of force is
necessary to avoid this danger" help the Alliance."o The defense
permits the victim to take the risk both that he will kill the attacker
and that fighting back my increase the harm to the victim. If victims
are allowed to assume these risks in defending their lives, the Alliance
argued that terminally ill patients should also be allowed to assume
the risk that an experimental drug may hasten their death. Given that
self-defense principles permit a woman to abort a fetus even after
viability if "doing so is necessary to preserve her life or health," a
terminally ill patient should be able to use whatever medical means
are necessary to defend herself, even one that is prohibited by law,
just as the doctrine of self-defense justifies an assault on an attacker
otherwise prohibited by law.
The court rejected this analogy because the Alliance's case was
not about "using reasonable force to defend oneself nor was it about
access to life-saving treatment."' Rather it was about a person's
147. Id. at 707. Cf United States v. Mazzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3rd Cir. 2010) (law
banning obliteration of handgun serial numbers not a violation of Second Amendment
even though serial numbers did not exist in 1790).
148. Id. at 707.
149. Id. at 708.
150. Wayne F. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (4th ed. 2003).
151. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710.
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constitutional right to assume "enormous risk," in pursuit of
potentially lifesaving drugs. Unlike a situation in which the doctrine
of self-defense might properly apply, this case involves "risk from
drugs with no proven therapeutic effect, which at a minimum
separates this case from the abortion life of the mother exception.""'
Because terminally patients "cannot fairly be characterized as using
reasonable force to defend themselves when they take unproven and
unsafe drugs, the Alliance's desire that the terminally ill be free to
assume the risk of experimental drugs cannot draw support from the
doctrine of self-defense." 3
Because the Alliance's patients had no fundamental right at
stake, the government need only satisfy rational basis scrutiny. The
government's interest in protecting terminally ill patients from the
harm of unsafe drugs, which the Supreme Court had recognized in
United States v. Rutherford, is rationally related to protecting
terminally ill patients from drugs that may harm them and even
hasten death.'54
B. Inapplicability of Abigail Alliance to Organ Transplants
Abigail Alliance's holding that experimental or unproven
therapies are not within a due process or medical self-defense right of
a terminally ill patient should not prevent a scrutiny stricter than
rational basis to apply to bans on payment for safe and effective
therapies such as organ and tissue transplants. Although there is
always the question of whether a transplant will be successful for a
given patient, organ and tissue transplants are not experimental or
unproven for blood disorders and end stage organ disease.'
As a result, the en banc court's rejection in Abigail Alliance of
self-defense and tortious interference with a rescue as precedents for
the right claimed in that case would not be applicable to a ban on safe
and effective organ transplants or any other established therapy.
Established treatments such as organ transplant are appropriate for a
rescue since we know they work. They also are a form of self-
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 442 U.S. 544, 555-59 (1979).
155. Of course, as the frontiers of transplantation are expanded, some organ and
tissue transplants may rightly be classified as experimental and thus would not fit within
the category of established therapies. This is the case with composite transplants, now
being done for the face and limbs. See Tullius et al., supra note 129. However, there is no
FDA system for determining safety and efficacy for new surgical and medical procedures
and treatments that do not involve drugs and devices within the jurisdiction of the FDA.
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defense, in that they are as effective against a "medical intruder"-a
virus, bacteria, or cellular system gone awry-as a handgun against an
attacker. Indeed, someone who stole or destroyed the container with
the organ that has been donated to another, causing the death or
increased suffering of the intended recipient would be liable
criminally for homicide and civilly liable for tortious interference with
a rescue. A law that barred transplantation or substantially
burdened access to it should thus be subject to a scrutiny stricter than
rational basis. 57
The established nature of organ transplantation sidesteps Abigail
Alliance's reasoning about access to unproven treatments, but it still
leaves open the question of whether there is a due process negative
right to safe and effective medical treatments. As we have seen, that
issue will turn on whether Glucksburg's requirements of being
"deeply rooted in this nation's history" and "essential to ordered
liberty" are met when a person's life is at stake and he seeks an
established medical treatment to defend it.'"'
VHI. Burdens and Standing in Litigating the Right to Paid
Donation
Recognition of a constitutional right to access organ transplants
presents reasons why Congress should rethink NOTA's sweeping ban
on paid donations. If there is a right to use such treatments, then a
law prohibiting or greatly burdening their use would have to
withstand a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis. I will assume
that stricter scrutiny in such a case will entail the fundamental right,
compelling state interest, and no less restrictive means requirements
that have become standard in substantive due process analysis,
despite some hesitation by the Court in using such language.159
156. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (West 2011). The defendant in such a
case would have culpably caused the death of the person awaiting the transplant.
157. The same point would apply to embryonic stem cells therapies if they were
banned because they derived from intentionally destroyed embryos. In that case they
would have had to be approved by the FDA as safe and effective. The FDA would not be
authorized to prohibit their use on moral grounds alone, e.g., a moral objection to
obtaining the cells or tissue from embryonic stem cells. See John A. Robertson, Embryo
Culture and the "Culture of Life": Constitutional Issues in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate,
2006 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM 1 (2006).
158. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 67. Note also that Heller and McDonald did not spell out the
standard of scrutiny that would be applied to gun regulations. Heller did note that
"nothing in our opinion should cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
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The argument might not immediately spur legislative action, but
it could lead to a judicial challenge that would have that effect. A
facial attack on the ban would not work because there are situations
of paid donation that should be subject to prohibition.o An as-
applied attack, however, is another matter. One strategy would be
for an individual in need of an organ donation, e.g., a kidney, to come
forward with a live donor who is willing to donate only if paid and
challenge the Act on an as-applied individual basis. His case would
be stronger if he could show that the would-be donor was fully aware
of the risks of donation, had been carefully screened, was in good
health, was not especially poor, felt strongly that there should be
some reward for what he is doing, etc."' Another approach would be
to have a private organization create a system to recruit paid live
kidney or cadaveric donors, screen and protect them, and pay rewards
with price caps-along the lines of MMD.org approach-for patients
in need of organ transplants. Those healthy informed donors would
also join the suit under the premise that they will only donate if they
are paid.
The ban on payment may substantially burden patients in
particular situations unless there are paid donors, thus satisfying the
standing requirements of injury in fact, causation, and
redressability.m Banning payment to an identified living donor of
marrow or a kidney who is the best match for a plaintiff presents the
clearest case of standing." In the case of kidney transplant, dialysis is
more onerous and has serious health effects, which a transplant will
alleviate.'" Banning payment to a scheme that encourages persons to
register as potential donors and then follow through to receive the
reward is less directly harmful to a specific patient and could have
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and governmental buildings or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms." District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-627 (2008). For regulations that do not fall within this list of
those that are outside the reach of the Second Amendment, at the very least intermediate
scrutiny would apply if not also strict scrutiny. See United States v. Mazzarella, 614 F.3d
85 (3rd Cir. 2010).
160. See infra Part VIII.A.
161. See infra Part VIII.B.
162. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
163. Unless aspiration of bone marrow gave medical advantages over apheresis, a ban
on payment for aspirated bone marrow is burdensome to any person in need of a marrow
donation. See supra note 76 and accompanying text,
164. In that sense it is life saving, even if not immediately needed to save life.
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presented standing problems in Flynn v. Holder.'65 But there is no
question that it will affect some persons on organ waitlists even if they
are not identifiable at the time of the suit, so that current plaintiffs,
who are less immediately threatened, may raise their interests. 6
Their interest is close enough that the plaintiffs should withstand
objections to standing based on causation or redressability, if in fact
paid donation would materially increase their chance of a
transplant."'
VIII. Three Payment Programs and Their Constitutionality
Under NOTA
Having examined the case for access to organ donation as a
fundamental liberty right or a right of medical self-defense, I here
examine how NOTA's ban on three payment schemes would fare
under strict scrutiny. I conclude that an unregulated free market in
organ sales and purchases could be constitutionally banned, as could
a program that paid living donors for partial liver donations, but two
other privately regulated schemes with protective features could not
be banned.
A. Free Market Libertarianism
The most expansive position would be to have no governmental
restrictions at all on payment-a market approach without any
regulation except for fraud and deception. Whatever the libertarian
appeal of unfettered markets, few proponents of financial incentives
would go so far.
The ills of an unregulated market are many, from organ theft and
robbery to not paying the donors, misleading them about the risks of
the operation, and subjecting them to long term medical and
165. So the government argued in its petition for rehearing by the panel or an en banc
hearing by the entire Ninth Circuit. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1986. Indeed, one of the
plaintiffs had already received an autologous bone marrow transplant and was doing
reasonably well with it. His claim of standing rested on access to a closely matched donor
in case his autologous transplant failed. See supra note 22. (Author's telephone
conversation with Mike Hamel.)
166. As a comparison, whites challenging affirmative action programs in higher
education have to show that they would have been admitted if a race neutral scheme had
been used. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262
(2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 1536, 182 L. Ed. 2d 160 (2012).
167. An unpaid donation would also redress their need, but it is the scarcity of
nonpaid donations that has created the need for payment.
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employment harm that they had not fully appreciated at the time of
choice because of their poverty. This has been the experience in
India, Pakistan, China, and Eastern Europe with donors who are
poor, ill-informed, and deceived.'6 Donors may not receive the
promised fee and even if they do, they often end up with on-going
medical problems without any care or further compensation, and
have greater difficulty with employment. Similar concerns drove the
passage of NOTA, and they are valid considerations. When
payment moves beyond kidneys to liver lobe and cadaveric donations
the problems multiply. NOTA may have painted with too broad a
brush, but some regulatory brush strokes were needed.
Instructive here is the case of Levi Itzhak Rosenbaum, the first
person ever criminally charged with a violation of NOTA.'o
Rosenbaum is an Israeli citizen living in New York. He acted as a
kidney broker, finding poor donors through newspaper advertising in
Israel, and then arranging for them to come to the United States and
have the donation occur in U.S. hospitals falsely claiming that they
were altruistic unrelated donors. Three recipients paid $120,000-
$150,000 for their transplants arranged by Rosenbaum, $10,000 of
which went to the donor. A fourth case was arranged for $160,000,
but the recipient's agent negotiating the deal was an undercover FBI
agent who arrested Rosenbaum. He eventually pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison, fined, and made to
disgorge his profits because of his knowing and intentional violation
of NOTA."'
One of the recipients testified at his sentencing hearing that
Rosenbaum deserved sainthood and not prison, because he had saved
168. See generally Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling
a Kidney in India, 288 JAMA 1589 (2002) (selling a kidney does not lead to a long-term
economic benefit and may be associated with a decline in health). This study found that
women were often pressured by their husbands to sell their kidneys, such that 60% to 70%
of the sellers were women. Id. The financial need driving them was to pay off debts to
moneylenders. Id. at 1590-91. Glenn Cohen provides many more details of the effects on
donors and recipients of selling and buying kidneys on the black market in India and
elsewhere. See I. G. Cohen, Transplant Tourism, J. L. MED. & ETHICS (2012).
169. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1983 (proposal for an international paid kidney
exchange led to the enactment of NOTA).
170. John Thomas Didymus, Illegal Kidney Transplant Case Exposes Human Organs
Black-Market, DIGITAL JOURNAL (Oct. 29, 2011), www.digitaljournal.comlarticle/313570.
171. Reuters, Israeli Sentenced to 2.5 Years in Prison in U.S. for Dealing Kidneys,
HAARETZ (July 12, 2012, 3:06 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-
newslisraeli-sentenced-to-2-5-years-in-prison-in-u-s-for-dealing-kidneys-1.450543.
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her father's life when he was going downhill from long-term dialysis.
On the other hand, a donor said that he changed his mind at the last
minute on the operating table before the anesthesia was administered
and communicated that to Rosenbaum who did not stop the
operation, depriving him of a wanted kidney."
If Rosenbaum had not pled guilty, but instead challenged the
application of NOTA to him because the kidney transplants were
essential to save the recipient's lives and there was no compelling
interest and less restrictive alternatives, his case would be much
weaker than the paid kidney program described below. The
compelling interest would be the risks to donors and recipients of
unregulated broker arrangements for sale of a kidney that led to the
passage of NOTA in the first place. The countervailing concern
would be extortion of the needy recipient by the seller, but it could
work the other way: the offer to the donor who would be ill-informed,
exploited or coerced. The concerns about such unregulated
arrangements might well meet a stricter scrutiny than rational basis in
an as-applied setting.
Rosenbaum's hypothetical constitutional defense would be
stronger if he could show that he had implemented protections to
address all of the problems that lie behind an unregulated free market
approach. But it was clear he had not done so and it is unlikely that
many private for-profit brokers would install such protections. A
regulated system of payment that protects against those concerns,
whether privately or publicly imposed, would be a more appealing
alternative.'74
B. Paid Live Kidney Donations
Hedge Fund Honcho is a generous billionaire. He is committed
to improving organ donation because of the suffering of family
members and friends who died waiting for kidney transplants in a
situation where no live or cadaveric organs were found."' As a
believer in the power of markets yet cognizant of the need for
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Proponents of physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia have developed
protocols to meet the abuses that such practices could spawn. The Oregon Death with
Dignity Act has become the model for physician-assisted suicide in the United States. OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800-127.897 (West 2012).
175. Honcho was inspired in part by the efforts of other rich people who support
health endeavors with their money, e.g., the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and its
support of cures and vaccines for HIV.
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regulation, he is willing to put his money where his head and heart
are, and will initially donate $25 million to the MoreKidneyDonors
Foundation ("MKD"), which will pay rewards to live kidney donors
to get more kidneys into the system.
Honcho understands the importance of careful screening for
health and informed consent, does not want to exploit financial need
or create situations of coercion, and will require that MKD accept as
paid donors only those who meet those rigorous requirements-
including that they be U.S. citizens."' Recipients will be those
without a family member able or willing to make an unpaid live
donation and who have been on a waiting list for at least a year. A
hospital ethics and consent transplant committee will have to approve
the consent process as well and be willing to participate in the overall
program. 177Health and lost wages insurance will be provided to the
donor to cover any medical problems that occur as a result of the
donation."'
MKD will make cash payments to those selected as donors, who
will have the option of directing them to charitable, housing, or
educational uses as they choose. More important than the form of
the paid consideration is the amount. Honcho and MKD settle on a
reward cap of $20,000. The amount is based on a comparison of what
egg donors are paid (maximum of $10,000) and the greater
intrusiveness and risk of the surgery."'7  More details will be needed
before going operational, but there is enough now to assess whether
NOTA could constitutionally be applied to stop MKD's program or a
comparable one operating on a lesser scale.
MKD's payment program is compensation for some of the costs
in time, inconvenience, risk, and physical burden that a live kidney
donor undergoes, but it is still less than the value of a kidney. R. S.
176. This requirement is meant to prevent foreigners from being recruited as kidney
donors and the problems that have surfaced in such transactions and in transplant tourism
generally. See Reuters supra note 171 (discussing the Rosenbaum case where he recruited
noncitizens to serve as donors in the United States).
177. See infra note 185 (discussion of effect of international declarations against organ
trafficking and their effect on United States health care providers participating in MKD's
program).
178. There is the issue of what the paid donor's priority will be for a kidney transplant
if his one remaining kidney becomes dysfunctional.
179. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reproductive Med., Financial Compensation
of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 307 (2007). While payments as high as
$8,000 to $10,000 might now occur in the Northeast and West regions, a 2007 study found
that the national average was $4,217. Sharon N. Covington & William E. Gibbons, What
Is Happening to the Price of Eggs, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1001 (2007).
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Gaston et al., had proposed expanding the concept of paid expenses
under NOTA to include the costs of life and health insurance for the
donor, the donor's out-of-pocket expenses, and lost wages.' It also
added $5,000 compensation for "inconvenience, anxiety, and/or
pain."' MKD's payment for "inconvenience, anxiety, and/or pain" is
greater than the Gaston group proposed, based on egg donation
payment rates and the greater risks and inconvenience of kidney
surgery. It is also probably less than what a kidney would fetch on an
open market for a donor."
The amount as such is less important than the principle of some
payment for their donation. It does mean that there will be "valuable
consideration" paid beyond expenses as presently defined. But that
"valuable consideration" is intended to cover some of the intangible
costs incurred by the donor and is not a premium or amount above
those costs.' The argument will be whether that is reasonable
compensation for recognized burdens or a sale of a kidney for money
beyond reasonable compensation.
Having set up its program with its screening system in place and
doctors and hospitals that are willing to participate if the legal threat
is removed, MKD has now filed suit against the United States
government on behalf of those recipients who might receive a kidney
donation under this program. The first question would be whether
NOTA in this as-applied challenge burdens a fundamental right by
preventing potential recipients from receiving life-sustaining kidney
transplants. If there is no fundamental right, then the easily met
rational basis test will apply and MKD will lose. On the other hand, if
the due process arguments presented above are accepted, NOTA
would interfere with the right of the potential recipient to receive a
life-saving kidney transplant. Would the government be able to
satisfy the stricter scrutiny then required?
180. See Gaston et al., supra note 14, at 2551.
181. Id.
182. MKD's system thus has donors subsidizing recipients, a perennial problem with
trying to limit fees or prices to prevent exploitation, coercion, or undue inducement of
persons of lesser means providing the good or service in demand.
183. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 478 for a definition of what is a sale beyond the
donor's costs.
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1. Protection of Donors and Recipients
Live kidney donation is not risk-free. Few deaths have occurred,
but complications may occur in 1% to 3% of the cases.184 There is
insufficient data to know for sure, though it is said that being a live
kidney donor does not affect life or health insurance rates, although
contact sports are not recommended. Careful medical screening of
the donor is essential to make sure the donor is in good health.
Retrieval by laparoscopy will minimize the risk and intrusiveness
even further. The hospital where the surgery will be performed may
add an additional medical and ethical screen if needed to ensure
protections for the donor." Health and life insurance will also be
provided to donors to cover the medical costs of the procedure and
any costs attributable to it.
MKD will take steps to ensure that there is informed consent and
no coercion, exploitation, or undue inducement." The risk of fraud
on the donor will be minimized, an insurance policy to take care of
their health and medical needs in the future will be provided, and
living related donors will still donate without money. With a price
cap, the worse cases of exploitation or coercion will also be
prevented. Still, some of the unrelated donors drawn by this scheme
will be doing it because of their need for money.
Careful screening to protect the donor will also protect the
recipient from a donor medical or family history that is kept secret to
gain the financial reward offered. A full informed consent would
make any donor rethink the bargain-$5,000 to $20,000-for the
hours spent and pain and intrusiveness of the paid donation. Whole
genomic sequencing will uncover other risk factors. A center using
184. Dorry L. Segev et al., Perioperative Mortality and Long-Term Survival Following
Live Kidney Donation, 10 JAMA 959 (2010). A death occurred in 2012 due to a faulty clip
used in cutting off the renal artery, a problem that the device maker has now presumably
fixed. John Bonifield & Elizabeth Cohen, Kidney-Donor Deaths Linked to Surgical Clips
Raises Issues of Alerts, Warning, CNN (June 21, 2012, 11:09 AM EDT),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/20/health/kidney-clips/index.html.
185. The cooperation of hospital and doctors with MKD's program may conflict with
professional declarations and guidelines against organ trafficking or commercialization.
See Cohen, supra note 168. Those declarations may have to be rethought for paid
donations in the United States when there are protections in place to prevent the harms
that occur in black market international transplant tourism. Id.
186. These measures will alleviate the need for the paternalism that Cohen backs for
poor and uneducated persons in India, Pakistan, and elsewhere who are now selling their
kidneys in black market transactions through brokers to transplant tourists. See Cohen,
supra note 168.
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paid donors will have incentives to take extra steps to uncover risks to
recipients that paid donors may be tempted to hide.
The government burden will be to show that the risks and harms
of live donations are acceptable when there is no payment but
become so when there is payment, even with the thorough, multi-
tiered screening that will be done to protect both the donor and the
recipient. If so, it cannot be because the risks and harms differ.
Rather, it must be because the prospect of payment leads to coercion,
undue inducement, or coercion problems, that payment will crowd
out altruistic donors, or that payment is unacceptable on other moral
grounds.
2. The Fairness Argument: Coercion, Exploitation, and Undue
Inducement
With the many levels of health and consent screening at both
MKD and then at the hospital where the donation will occur, the
donor should be well aware of the risks of kidney donation. For an
unrelated donor, the question will be whether the compensation for
"pain, inconvenience, and anxiety" is so coercive, unduly inducive, or
exploitative that preventing it would satisfy the strict scrutiny needed
to uphold a ban on such payments.
It may well be that only low income persons would consider
donating a kidney for money. In that case financial need is a relevant,
if not the driving, force of their participation. Other nonrelated
donors who had rejected unpaid kidney donors might now find that
MKD's reward makes donation now so attractive that they are willing
to go forward, just as some women find payment a decisive factor in
their choosing to serve as a surrogate mother.' In neither case,
however, does the offer of money alone "coerce" them into
participation. MKD is not compelling them by an unlawful or
unreasonable threat. True, they are being offered something valuable
that hopefully will induce them to take on risk and harm that they
would not otherwise agree to." But there is no widely accepted
account of coercion, undue inducement, and possibly not even
exploitation that would make MKD's offer wrong on any of those
grounds. 89
187. Data on the motivations of nonrelated kidney donors and surrogate mothers is
needed, as is data on who opts for the MKD program if even created.
188. Cohen, supra note 8, at 690.
189. See A. Wertheimer, Coercion 192-208, 267, 272-74 (1987); see also A.
Wertheimer, Exploitation in Clinical Research, in J. S. Hawkins and E. J. Emanuel,
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The risk they are taking is not unreasonable, because altruistic
donors have long assumed them without paid inducement. Nor is it
irresistible, as a threat to their life or as a very great payment in light
of their circumstances would be. But the offer of payment is tempting
and is intended to make a difference. Still, it is not necessarily an
unfair exploitation, when viewed ex ante from the prospects before
them.9 o They expect to be made better off, even at some physical cost
to themselves, but after they have been fully informed of the burdens
involved, some will find it in their interests to do so. It is hard, also,
to find payment for a kidney donation-with its protections for
reducing harm and informing the donor of what she will in fact
experience-so different than the payments made to research
subjects, egg donors, surrogate mothers, and persons in highly risky
work.19'
The cap on payment at $5,000 to $20,000 should additionally
prevent the worst cases of exploitation in that it does not so entice
them that they overlook the health risks. On the other hand, setting a
cap is itself exploitive in that it may deprive them of the full benefit of
what they are doing."' Yet increasing the cap or setting none at all
risks creating undue inducements, e.g., offering so much that it
becomes hard to say no. Other requirements, such as being free of
debt and having an income of at least $25,000 a year, would avoid the
worst problems seen in India.
In short, given other accepted practices with comparable risks, it
is hard to see how prevention of exploitation or undue inducement is
such a threat that it would satisfy strict scrutiny. A price cap on such
payments would mean that the donor would have to internalize
certain costs in order to protect some people who might be driven by
their need for money. Those with less wealth may be more willing to
Exploitation in Developing Countries: The Ethics of Clinical Research 63, 71 (2008);
Ezekiel Emmanuel, Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts, 5 AMER. J. BIOETHICS 9, 13
(2005). The question of exploitation is more complicated. See Cohen, supra note 8, at
690. The answer may also be different in the context of a very large ongoing government-
funded program and the government threatens to cut off all funding unless the recipient
takes on another obligation. See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012) (Affordable Care Act provision to cut off all existing
Medicaid funding unless states expand coverage an unconstitutional compulsion of the
states).
190. Wertheimer, supra note 189; Cohen, supra note 8, at 690-91.
191. The risks and the amounts vary in each of these endeavors. It is hard to say that
paid kidney donation is riskier than paid surrogacy, which is legal.
192. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1910-11
(1997).
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take on these costs than those with more wealth, but that is true of
other paid endeavors as well. Why the money-for-kidney situation
should be treated differently when protections are in place and other
concerns dealt with remains unclear. With the screens and regulation
that MKD provides, concerns about coercion, exploitation, and
undue inducement should not satisfy heightened scrutiny.
3. Crowding Out Altruism
A main argument against paid organ donation is that it will
undermine or crowd out the unpaid altruistic system, which itself is a
public good. People who would otherwise donate without payment
will now refuse to do so because others are paid, or will do so only if
they are paid as well.
Richard Epstein, Julia Mahoney, and others have examined this
claim and have found that the main data used to support it are drawn
from situations that are greatly different than organ donation."' As
Mahoney notes, "[w]hether a particular reward will 'crowd out,'
'crowd in,' or have a 'crowding neutral' effect . . . is hard to predict.",,
She goes on to note that "most situations in which researchers have
detected 'crowding out' differ markedly from organ procurement."'
She concludes that "[u]ntil far more work is done, 'crowding out'
must remain an interesting, but unconvincing, hypothesis."'96 Richard
Epstein also agrees. 97 At the very least such speculation would not in
itself satisfy the stronger justification needed to ban paid live kidney
donations when necessary to protect another person's life.
4. Additional Moral Concerns
The same goes for the moral reasons per se against payment-
that payment for undergoing surgery and losing a kidney is immoral
because of its corrupting effects on traditional attitudes toward the
body.' The Flynn court noted the "instinctive revulsion [people feel]
193. As both Epstein and Mahoney note, the oft-cited examples of the Swiss case of
rejecting payment for a nuclear waste dump, and paying a fine for late pick up of children
at an Israeli day care center, among others, simply aren't comparable to organ donation.
See Epstein, supra note 9, at 480-81; Mahoney, supra note 14, at 25-26.
194. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 25-26.
195. Id. at 26.
196. Id.
197. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 480-81.
198. The concern that it is part of the growing monetization of daily life, while perhaps
true, must be weighed against the monetization of every other part of the transplant
process and the patient's need for a lifesaving transplant. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
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at denial of bodily integrity, particularly removal of flesh from a
human for use by another, and most particularly 'commodification' of
such conduct, that is, the sale of one's bodily tissue."'" It noted that
commerce in organs is "generally seen as revolting."2 " To explain
why "most of us are revolted by the notion of a poor person selling a
kidney to feed his family," the court relied on Leon Kass' analogy to
the "taboos we have against cannibalism, defilement of corpses, and
necrophilia," and the idea that "to dispose of oneself as a mere means
to some end of one's own liking is to degrade the humanity in one's
person." 20' Kass goes on to say that in this view, "organ
transplantation ... is-once we strip away the trappings of the sterile
operating rooms and their astonishing technologies-simply a noble
form of cannibalism."202
The Flynn court did note that "these reasons are in some
respects vague, in some speculative, and in some arguably misplaced,"
and that "[there are strong arguments for contrary views."20 For the
Flynn court, however, it was enough that there were mixed views,
because Congress needed only meet a rational basis test, and might
appropriately take the moral high ground on commodification if it so
chose.20
When stricter scrutiny is applied, the outcome is different. Even
if government under rational basis review may take one side in a
moral controversy, strict scrutiny would defang those views of their
legislative priority. The Supreme Court has held this to be the case
WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); Michael Ignatieff,
The Price of Everything, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 7, 2012, at 23, available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/103336/michael-sandel-philosophy-
liberalism-democracy-market-economy-morality-income-inequality# (criticizing Sandel
for not providing a politics to correct the ills he decries).
199. Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing S. REP. No. 98-382, at
17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982 ("[H]uman body parts should not be
seen as commodities[.]")).
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE
CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 181-83,185 (2002)). Of course, the revulsion may be less
from analogies to cannibalism and necrophilia than to a social system that does not
provide for basic necessities.
202. KASS, supra note 201, at 185.
203. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 861 (citing Virginia Postrel,.. .With Functioning Kidneys For
All, THE ATLANTIC (July 9, 2009) available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2009/07/with-functioning-kidneys-for-all/7587).
204. Id. at 862. Even moral distaste will not satisfy rational basis if the distaste is
directed to a minority, such as homosexuals. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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with reproductive rights concerning birth control and abortion, and
interracial marriage, and would be likely to do so with regard to
same-sex marriage if it ever had reason to apply a scrutiny stricter
than rational basis to such prohibitions.205
There may be some moral taboos, such as those against incest or
cannabilism, that are so deeply rooted that few disagree with them."
But that is not the case for paying for money for transactions
involving the body. Except for the first step in organ
transplantation-donation of the organ-every other step is paid,
including the procurement and acquisition organization, the doctors,
nurses, hospitals, and others involved with transplanting organs.207
There is a huge market in bones and other tissues. No one argues
that they are "commodifying" the human body. Recall the many
other instances in which we tolerate payment for bodily intrusions-
from blood, sperm, and egg donation to surrogate motherhood and
paying subjects in clinical research for the prodding and poking and
risks that they undergo. We also pay risk premiums for dangerous
work. Drawing a moral line against paying the living, unrelated
kidney donor to undergo risk, inconvenience, anxiety, and pain while
permitting egg donors, surrogate mothers, research subjects, and
workers in hazardous jobs to be paid cannot be justified by moral
distaste alone. Leon Kass, Michael Sandel, and others may be
revolted by these practices, but societal acceptance or legalization of
them deprives Kass and Sandel of a claim that revulsion at paying for
organs is as deeply rooted as incest or cannibalism taboos. Indeed,
many people do not share the revulsion or think that they are
corrupting at all.208
205. The government's moral or essentialist corruption concerns that are not directed
toward a particular group may provide a rational basis for government action but fall short
of the stricter scrutiny applied to violation of a fundamental rights.
206. Even this claim has to be qualified. Adult sibling incest is different than parent
child, and has its proponents. One could also slice the cannibalism taboo into before and
after death, with or without consent, and other variations. See The Queen v. Dudley &
Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (Q.B.); see also Mark Landler, Eating People is Wrong!
But Is It Homicide? Court to Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2003), www.nytimes.com/
2003/12/26/international/26CANN.html; Mark Landler, German Court Convicts Internet
Cannibal of Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2004), www.nytimes.com/2004/01/31/
world/german-court-convicts-internet-cannibal-of-manslaughter.html.
207. See Mahoney, supra note 14, at 23.
208. Volokh, supra note 20, at 1843-44.
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C. Rewards for Cadaveric Donations
The discussion has focused on live donors of kidneys, and argued
that a regulated system of cash payments run by a private
organization such as MKD would prevent the government from
satisfying the stricter scrutiny that it would have to show to apply
NOTA to those programs. Would that analysis change if the rewards
were paid for cadaveric donations?
Cadaveric donations are a mainstay of solid organ
transplantation since the heart, lungs, whole liver, and other organs
cannot be removed without causing the donor's death-a violation of
the dead donor rule.20 Until interest revived in donation after cardiac
death ("DCD"), it was thought not possible to retrieve those organs
without legal recognition of whole brain death. A brain dead person
would still have artificially maintained cardiopulmonary activity but
would have no brain function and thus would be declared dead. With
legal recognition of brain death and state anatomical gift laws to
clarify who had decisional authority over the remains, cadaveric
donation and organ transplantation took off in the 1970s, spurred by
the discovery of cyclosporine and more effective immunosuppressive
agents. Organ procurement organizations sprang up, required
request laws became part of Medicare certification, and the harvest of
cadaveric organs increased. Even though the number of cadaveric
organs is limited by those in a situation of brain death (or who would
qualify under DCD), the procurement system has not yet reached
that limit.2 0 An offer of financial reward may produce more consents
to donation than are now forthcoming.
An acceptable program for paid cadaveric donations presents
different problems than paid programs for blood stem cells or
kidneys. Hedge Fund Honcho again would step into the breach. He
would fund a nonprofit foundation, More Cadaveric Donors
("MCD"), which would provide rewards to the estate of a person who
had previously signed an organ donor directive and a cadaveric
209. That rule is reflected in homicide law, which would punish a physician and
hospital that performed a voluntary donation of a heart, when doing so would cause the
donor's death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (West 2011); John A. Robertson,
The Dead Donor Rule, 29 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6, (No. 6, 1999).
210. Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the
United States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7 (2003) (suggests increasing consent from requests
for organ donation in large hospitals).
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donation resulted, or in the absence of a directive the family or next
of kin agreed to a cadaveric donation.2 '
Many details would have to be worked out. Ideally the MCD
program would work in coordination with existing organ procurement
programs. After they informed the family of their option to donate,
procurement personnel would then inform them that they might
qualify for a one-time payment to the estate from MCD.
Procurement professionals, however, may object to any money paid
to cadaveric donors, and distance themselves from MCD.212 This
would leave MCD to contact the family on its own, perhaps with
hospital cooperation, or have donors contact MCD. With publicity
and hospital cooperation, MCD's program will eventually become
known to many people. Still few families or people have ever thought
of being in this situation, much less about being paid for donation of
their loved one's organs."' Out of fairness to them, some way of
being informed of MCD's reward program should exist as they
consider making a donation.
A key question is how much the reward should be. A cadaveric
donation is much more valuable than a live marrow or kidney
donation. The heart, lungs, liver, both kidneys, and skin and bone
could be harvested, possibly saving the life of six or more persons, as
well as skin, bones, corneas, and other parts that would help others.
MCD, however, will not try to compensate the estate to that extent,
just as the other payment programs have not paid the full value of
what is donated. Instead it proposes to make a $5,000 payment to the
estate if the donation occurs.214
Here, risks to the donor and recipient are not applicable.215 A
cadaveric donation can occur only after brain death is declared, which
211. 1 put aside payment in cases of donation after cardiac death, where there may be
a greater risk of improper influence.
212. See Mahoney, supra note 14, at 30.
213. See generally Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (state
cornea-removal law deprives next-of-kin of quasi-property interest in disposal of body
unless they have been notified in advance).
214. Pennsylvania authorizes payment from a state fund "for reasonable hospital and
other medical expenses, funeral expenses and incidental expenses incurred by the donor
or donor's family in connection with making a vital organ donation. Such expenditures
shall not exceed $3,000 per donor and shall only be made directly to the funeral home,
hospital or other service provider related to the donation ... The advisory committee shall
develop procedures, including the development of a pilot program, necessary for
effectuating the purposes of this paragraph." PA. CONS. STAT. § 8622(b)(1) (West 2000).
215. The idea of compensation for "inconvenience, pain, and anxiety" of physical
intrusion is not applicable here, since there is none. There may, however, be psychological
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is a medical decision. At that point the deceased donor has no
interests to be protected. The screening for infections and other risks
for the recipient will be the same whether or not there is a payment to
the estate: The family, however, has an interest in being approached
respectfully, not exhorted, and their decision not to donate respected.
1. Undue Inducement of Family
There is the question of whether the family will be induced to
change what they otherwise would have decided about organ
donation because of the payment to the estate. That of course is the
point, but the question is whether there is anything unfair or
unreasonable about asking them to do so. They are not being paid to
undergo bodily risk or intrusion, but their decision-making will be
complicated if money is involved. Since organ donation at death has
long been acceptable, there are no risks of informing them of that
option, other than the need to grapple with the complications that
money beyond decisional costs if there is no payment would bring.216
Will the poor and less well off be more likely to accede to
donation because of the payment? The amount is relatively small.
Still, for many people with no estate and/or creditors it will be
tempting.2 17 Indeed, such an inducement might in the long run benefit
them or their community (some ethnic groups have low donation
rates and a high need for transplants), but in the short run it may
seem exploitive. Nor will they be bearing an unfair share of
contributing to organ transplants, since better-off persons may donate
anyway.
2. Crowding Out Altruism
Is there a stronger claim here that with live unrelated kidney
donors a financial reward system will drive out altruistic cadaveric
donations? There is no special reason why this will occur, nor that
people will decide not to donate at all. If payments do occur and
weaken altruism, it will also increase the cost of transplantation. But
the costs of transplant will be much less than the costs of maintaining
turmoil and guilt over whether to accept or reject payment. These could be significant in
complex family situations and lead to counseling costs. Of course, conflict and guilt may
occur regardless of payment.
216. See Mahoney, Should We Adopt a Market Strategy to Organ Donation," THE
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 65, 77 (Wayne Shelton & John Balint, eds., 2001)
(discusses exhortation costs).
217. The legislature could protect this payment from creditors. Cf Goyal et al., supra
note 168, at 1590 (role of creditors in pushing debtors to undergo paid organ donations).
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someone without transplant--either keeping them alive longer while
they remain on the waiting list or until they die. Neither fears of
crowding out altruism nor the increased costs of transplant seem great
enough to constitute a compelling state interest.
3. Commodifying Death
Here the concern is not harm to the donor or the pool of
altruism, but to the moral notion of profiting from death. The notion
is that the prospect of filthy lucre is contaminating the dead body.
But there is monetary "contamination" of death throughout the
system, from the transfer of wealth that occurs through inheritance,
the medical procedures ordered to stave off death, and the benefit to
all those who profit from organ donation and transplantation. How
one frames the question is key. In this case, payment may be seen as
less a sale of the body or the organs than a sharing in some of the
good that the donation will bring to others. Some would question this
idea of reciprocity, finding the idea of "rewarded gift" a contradiction
in terms. Others would find it fair that the donor and donor family
receive something for the great contribution that they have made to
the wellbeing of others. Given these differing opinions and the
commercialized practices that surround death anyway, it is doubtful
that these concerns are strong enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.
4. Paid Cadaveric Donation: A Closer Question
Assuming that MCD has standing to raise the issue and there is
enough burden on prospective recipients, whether the government
may meet heightened scrutiny in the as-applied situation outlined
here is closer than with paid donations for blood stem cells and
kidneys. If there are adequate protections for informed consent, a
free choice is certainly possible. Exclusion of donations after cardiac
death lessens the risk of conflicts of interest in decisions to terminate
life support due to the prospect of payment."' Some families will be
drawn to the prospect of a $5,000 reward to the estate or for funeral
and medical expenses, especially if there is otherwise no estate to
speak of. Yes, they may be tempted by the money to do something
that they would not otherwise do, but an inducement to donate
beyond pure altruism is not itself coercive, unduly inducive, or
exploitive. Others will find it appropriate that if everyone else in the
organ transplant system makes a profit, the family should in some
218. See discussion supra Part VIII.C.1-4.
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modest way as well. At the very least, there is an argument for trying
such an approach and studying its effects on the cadaveric donation
rate.
Is the application of NOTA to MCD's cadaveric payment
scheme unconstitutional? The question is closer than with paid blood
stem cell and kidney donations, but it is still reasonable to conclude
that it is. If the burden is on government to show a strong case that
the payment system will likely have the harmful effects that drove
NOTA, it may be hard for defenders of the law to make that case.
Speculation and conjecture about crowding out and moral distaste
alone will not do. In the end it may turn on whether judges, who
otherwise agree that a protected liberty interest in receiving necessary
medical treatment is at stake, find that there is enough of a payoff-
given the gap between availability of cadaveric donors and what is
already harvested-that MCD's cadaveric payment schemes will
make a significant difference in saving lives without causing undue
harm. If so, they should not constitutionally be banned" 9
IX. Conclusion: Change by Courts or Legislatures
Legislative action to modify NOTA to permit the programs
discussed above is unlikely in the immediate future. If change is to
occur it will result from private actors organizing financial reward
programs that regulate away the main concerns with paid donation
and then litigate whether NOTA can constitutionally be applied to
ban them. There will be both procedural and substantive hurdles to
getting this claim heard.
The main obstacle will be the reluctance of judges to move
beyond rational basis to a stricter scrutiny of a law that substantially
burdens a person's ability to protect his life or liberty with a safe and
effective medical treatment. That move means extending the right of
self-defense against human attackers to defending one's self against
viral and bacterial threats from disease, illness, or trauma. Strict
originalists and textualists will not make this move, but moderate
219. See discussion supra note 137 and accompanying text. There, the question of
medical self-defense was itself at issue because of the unproven nature of the efficacy of
the treatment sought, a Phase II drug not yet studied for efficacy. Here, there is no
question of the safety and efficacy of organ transplant for end-stage order disease. Rather,
the question is the likelihood of the net harmful effects, which the state asserts justifies the
burden on that right. Still, the need for an experimental program to gather such data, if
not legislatively authorized, is too distant from burdening the fundamental right to be
found unconstitutional and may not even be closely enough related to confer standing to
raise the issue.
274 [Vol. 40:2
originalists and textualists, as well as those more sympathetic to a
"living constitution" approach might be willing to take that step when
safety, efficacy, and widespread acceptance of the treatment exists.
While there is no certainty about how much lifting the bar on
payment will increase organ supply, there is good reason for thinking
that it will-that some donors will come forward who might not
otherwise have done so and additional lives will be saved.
Legislatures have expertise in judging the ill effects of the
payment schemes proposed. But their judgment should receive less
deference when the harmful impact on patients' lives becomes more
pronounced and they have the burden of showing that their
restrictions serve compelling interests without less restrictive ways of
achieving them. Moral and philosophical objections to money alone,
a mainstay of opposition to paid organ donation, are not compelling
interests under strict scrutiny. Nor are concerns about harming or
exploiting donors or crowding out altruism well enough established
that they shield NOTA's broad ban from all as-applied attacks.
Eventually a court might find that a carefully designed private
program to protect donors and limit exploitation cannot
constitutionally be banned by NOTA. Such a decision might awaken
the legislative process. It will comport with the growing weight of
opinion that some use of financial incentives to increase the supply of
lifesaving organs is desirable.
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